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The purpose of the present research was to investigate text comprehension of 
narrative texts at varying levels of comprehension and examine how metacomprehension 
varies as a function of the level of comprehension when making retrospective (posttest) 
confidence judgments of performance.  Using Kintsch’s construction-integration theory 
of text comprehension, three types of question were developed to probe textbase and 
situation model levels of text representation at three levels of difficulty:  (a) textbase, 
literal (easiest), (b) situation model, temporal ordering (low difficulty inferences), and  
(c) situation model, propositional logic (high difficulty inferences).  Differences in 
percent correct, response time in milliseconds per character, and max amplitude of pupil 
size confirmed the predicted difficulty of the three question types, except that there was 
no significant difference in pupil size between the literal and temporal ordering questions.  
The three types of questions were then used to examine the effect of question difficulty 
on metacomprehension judgments of confidence, absolute accuracy (calibration accuracy 
and bias), and relative accuracy (Goodman-Kruskal gamma coefficient or G).  
Results showed that readers were sensitive to different levels of comprehension 
and showed different levels of metacomprehension confidence and accuracy depending 
on the type of question.  As predicted, absolute accuracy showed the effects of anchoring-
and-adjustment when making these judgments across question type.  That is, subjects 
appeared to be anchoring on a moderate estimate of success that corresponded most 
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closely in this study to performance on literal questions and adjusted their confidence for 
temporal ordering and propositional logic questions.  The results related to bias provided 
support for the hard-easy effect, with propositional logic questions (i.e., hard questions) 
showing overconfidence and literal questions (i.e., easy questions) showing no significant 
bias, although bias scores did not discriminate between temporal ordering and 
propositional logic questions.  As predicted, relative accuracy (G) appeared to be stable 
across question types with no significant differences by question type.  As with previous 
studies, the differences in the results concerning absolute versus relative accuracy suggest 
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In recent years, researchers have made attempts to integrate theories (or models) 
of text comprehension with theories of metacomprehension of text, or the ability to judge 
one’s own comprehension of a text (Dunlosky, Rawson, & Hacker, 2002; Wiley, Griffin, 
& Thiede, 2005).  Much of this research has been exploratory, but current findings have 
shown that accuracy of metacomprehension judgments is tied not only to general text 
comprehension but also to specific kinds of text comprehension (Dunlosky, Rawson, & 
Middleton, 2005; Salmen, 2004).  The concept of comprehension implies more than one 
possible level of comprehension, ranging from literal memory of text to inferential 
processing (Kintsch, 1998), and therefore, the concept of metacomprehension implies 
more than one possible level of metacomprehension.  The purpose of the present research 
was to investigate text comprehension at literal and inferential levels and examine how 
metacomprehension varies as a function of level of comprehension. 
According to the construction-integration model (Kintsch, 1998), a reader’s 
comprehension of text material may vary at different levels of comprehension.  For 
example, reading at a textbase level of comprehension may require the simple retrieval of 
information from memory about the text, whereas reading at a situation model level of 
comprehension may require the generation of inferences based on information from the 
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text and the reader’s background knowledge.  Although some types of inference appear to 
be relatively automatic for readers, others require greater cognitive effort (Graesser, 
Louwerse, McNamara, Olney, Cai, & Mitchell, 2007; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998).   
Examining varied levels of comprehension has important implications for 
metacomprehension of text (Dunlosky et al., 2002; Wiley et al., 2005).  Although the 
construction-integration model has been applied only in limited ways in the research on 
metacomprehension (Dunlosky et al., 2002; Salmen, 2004), bringing theories of 
comprehension together with theories of metacomprehension provides a promising new 
area of research that can potentially inform both areas.  Varied levels of comprehension 
should arguably impact how readers monitor their comprehension and how accurately 
they can monitor.  Wiley et al. (2005) suggested that comprehension at the situation 
model level should provide a better measure of comprehension than the textbase level 
because it is the integration of textual information with background knowledge that is the 
desired goal of reading.  With this in mind, knowing how readers monitor their 
comprehension at the situation model level and whether they can accurately monitor 
across all types of inferences are important questions to be researched.  In addition, 
because most research of metacomprehension has focused on expository texts, examining 
these questions with narrative texts can potentially expand our knowledge of 
metacomprehension.     
This study followed an integrated approach to assess comprehension and 
metacomprehension using narrative texts and three types of questions that measure varied 
levels of comprehension:  literal questions (textbase), temporal ordering inference 
questions (situation model, low difficulty), and propositional logic inference questions 
  3 
 
(situation model, high difficulty).  To examine metacomprehension, posttest confidence 
judgments of performance and metacomprehension accuracy were measured for each of 
these question types.   
Review of the Literature 
Comprehension of Text 
According to the construction-integration model (Kintsch, 1998; Kintsch & van 
Dijk, 1978), a reader’s comprehension of text involves the construction of an internal 
representation of the information presented in the text and the subsequent integration of 
this information with existing knowledge.  Kintsch (1998) proposed that “a context-
insensitive construction process is followed by a constraint-satisfaction, or integration, 
process that yields if all goes well, an orderly mental structure out of initial chaos” (p. 5).  
The reader’s text representation may be separated into three levels of comprehension:   
(a) the lexical, or surface features of text (words, syntax); (b) the textbase, or basic 
propositions found in text; and (c) the situation model, or propositions that elaborate into 
a whole and extend to general world knowledge and personal experience. 
Assessments of comprehension have included the use of different types of 
questions to measure different levels of comprehension.  Lexical comprehension can be 
measured with word-level types of questions, although decoding of words becomes 
automatic for most readers relatively quickly.  Therefore, most research has focused on 
textbase and situation model levels of comprehension.  Textbase comprehension can be 
measured with literal questions because the required information appears explicitly in the 
text or can be derived by making basic inferences that are required for maintaining the 
local coherence of a text.  Finally, a situation model level of comprehension can be 
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measured with inferential questions because comprehension at this level requires the 
integration of textual information with the reader’s background knowledge; therefore, 
some information required to answer the question does not appear directly in the text.  
Correctly answering these questions would indicate that readers were successful at 
retaining some information from the text and constructing the remaining information 
through inferential processing within the context of their background knowledge.  
Whether the inference is constructed during reading (i.e., online) or only after reading 
(i.e., offline) when prompted by the question is not captured by this type of 
comprehension assessment.   
Kintsch (1998) provided a simplified way to classify reading inferences (see 
Table 1).  In this typology, all inferences can be classified in one of four categories 
defined by two axes:  automatic versus controlled, and retrieval versus generation.  
Automatic inferences require less cognitive effort in comparison to controlled inferences; 
and retrieval implies that the information needed for the inference may be easily accessed   
Table 1  
A Classification System for Inferences in Text Comprehension  
(Adapted from Kintsch, 1998, p. 189) 
 Retrieval Generation 
Automatic processes A.  bridging inferences, 
      associative elaborations 
C.  transitive inferences in a  
      familiar domain 
Controlled processes B.  search for bridging  
      knowledge 
D.  logical inferences *  
      [emphasis added]  
* Including inductive and deductive types of logic 
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from long-term memory whereas generation requires the generation of new information.  
For Kintsch, the inferences that best demonstrate a situation model level of 
comprehension require controlled generation—for example, inferences that involve 
“deductive reasoning” (p. 192).  In theory, the nature of the inference corresponds to the 
nature of the situation model being applied; therefore, Kintsch has inferred the 
importance of establishing the specific nature of situation models in addition to simply 
distinguishing between textbase and situation model levels of comprehension. 
Other examinations of inferences have expanded on the kinds of inference that are 
associated with text comprehension.  For example, Graesser, Louwerse, McNamara, 
Olney, Cai, and Mitchell (2007) classified 13 types as a “landscape of inferences” that 
might help researchers to address the whole landscape rather than ignoring large sections 
of it (p. 290).  They also provided four general categories of inferences based mainly on 
increasing levels of cognitive effort:  (a) automatic, generated very reliably and quickly 
(within about 500 ms) with minimal effort; (b) routine, more effort but still reliable and 
relatively quick (within about a second); (c) strategic, being sensitive to reader’s goals 
and strategies but moderately quick; and (d) off-line, made only after reading of text with 
considerable time and effort.   
In related research, Zwaan and colleagues (Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser, 1995; 
Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998) classified five dimensions that appear to be monitored 
automatically while reading narrative texts:  (a) time, the temporal order of narrative 
events, (b) space, the most immediate area(s) in which events occur, (c) information 
related to the protagonist, (d) causality of relevant events, and (e) intentionality of 
relevant characters.  Although this research was not concerned specifically with 
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inferences, these narrative dimensions may be assessed with either literal or inferential 
questioning.  For example, if the temporal ordering of narrative events is monitored 
automatically by readers, then related inferential questions should be relatively easy.   
According to the construction-integration model (Kintsch, 1998), inferences that 
require controlled generation (see Table 1, cell D) provide the best measure of a reader’s 
situation model, and inferences that fall within this category include logical inductive and 
deductive inferences (Graesser, Millis, & Zwaan, 1997; Kintsch, 1993; Kintsch, 1994).  
Inductive logic involves using premises to form generalizations that appear probable but 
may not be true; for example, if every raven seen by a person were black, that person 
might conclude that all ravens were black even though it is logically possible that non-
black ravens exist.  Deductive logic involves using premises to form necessary 
conclusions; for example, if it is given that all ravens are black, then it follows 
necessarily that any bird identified as a raven must also be black.  This study focused on 
deductive rather than inductive logic because necessary conclusions should produce 
clearer responses than probable conclusions.  More specifically, the study involved 
propositional logic.  Propositional logic is a specific type of deduction that has been 
applied to the “natural” or everyday propositions that exist as complex constructions in 
text and other discourse, in contrast to other basic forms of deductive logic (Braine, 
Reiser, Rumain, 1998; Braine et al., 1995).   
Although these types of inference are generally thought of as belonging to special 
cases of logic and are not “naturally” occurring, readers of narrative text appear to be able 
to make propositional logic inferences (Franks, 1997) and under certain conditions they 
may do so automatically (Lea, 1995).  Lea showed that when presented with five-to-six 
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contiguous propositions in narrative text, readers routinely made propositional logic 
inferences and often did not realize that they were making them.  Franks (1997) found 
that readers of varying age and ability can make propositional logic inferences to some 
degree of success and that the relative increases in performance for different types of 
logic and content across age groups were generally consistent with expectations of 
cognitive development.  Also, Rader and Sloutsky (2002) found that readers may be 
primed for propositional logic inferences regardless of whether those inferences were 
logically valid.  Thus, under certain conditions, readers can make these kinds of 
inference, and this process may be automatic when reading short narrative texts or short 
contiguous propositions that have been constructed in a way that is conducive for an 
automatic direct-reasoning approach (Lea, 1995).  Lea, Mulligan, and Walton (2005) also 
investigated whether readers make propositional logic inferences that were presented at 
some distance from one another, and found that these inferences appeared to be made 
more often when a later contextual cue was presented with the second premise to 
reactivate the first premise; however, these texts were presented a sentence at a time.  It 
remains to be explored whether readers make propositional logic inferences when reading 
more naturalistic texts that are longer than the typically short texts used in prior studies, 
as the present study does, and when they are not being cued for the inferences in 
proximity to the premises. 
It is important to note that some researchers (e.g., Gerrig & O’Brien, 2005) argue 
that automatic inferences are those that only require memory retrieval and that 
classifications of inferences may be misleading because of exceptions to the rule.  
However, my purpose in using these classifications was to serve as a foundation for the 
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generation of texts and questions that would present varying levels of difficulty.  It is also 
important to note that many studies of inference generation in reading comprehension 
have been concerned with online inferences, meaning the inferences were assumed to be 
made while in the process of reading the text (e.g., Lea, 1995; Zwaan et al., 1995).  In 
such studies, the presentation of text materials have been tightly controlled in order to 
look for evidence of inference generation during or immediately after the reading of 
necessary information.  In contrast, this study used longer, more naturalistic texts and 
each of these was followed by an assessment of comprehension with questions that may 
have actively promoted the generation of offline inferences, or inferences that were made 
after reading the text.  For this reason, the specific timing of inference generation was not 
established in this study.  Nevertheless, given that temporal ordering inferences with 
narrative texts are typically easier to generate online than propositional logic inferences, 
it seems likely that this would be the case for similar inferences generated offline.   
In sum, I conducted the first and second pilot studies to generate narrative texts 
and questions that would require retrieval of literal information from the texts and 
making temporal ordering and propositional logic inferences, which would differ on 
levels of difficulty as measured by percent correct and response time.  Once these 
questions were generated, I then moved on to the main focus of this research, which was 
to examine metacomprehension on these differing levels of comprehension. 
Metacomprehension of Text 
Construction-integration (Kintsch, 1998) is a model of text comprehension; 
however, it has been justifiably applied to the metacomprehension of text (Dunlosky, 
Rawson, & Hacker, 2002; Wiley, Griffin, & Thiede, 2005), which is typically defined as 
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the ability to judge one’s own learning or comprehension of text material (Dunlosky & 
Lipko, 2007; Maki & Berry, 1984).  In the following section, I provide a brief general 
discussion of metacomprehension and follow with the implications for the construction-
integration model. 
Metacomprehension is a specific application of metacognition, which may be 
defined simply as thinking about one’s own thoughts.  Two basic characteristics of 
metacognition are relevant to metacomprehension.  First, abundant evidence supports a 
distinction between automatic and controlled processes in metacognition, with automatic 
processes being implicit and fast compared with controlled processes being explicit and 
slower (Efklides, 2008).  Second, controlled metacognitive processes may become 
activated by task difficulty (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007), with more 
difficult tasks requiring greater control over cognitive processes. 
Metacomprehension accuracy has been measured using several different 
measures.  Each one provides insights into different aspects of metacomprehension, and 
in general, these measures may be assigned to either absolute accuracy or relative 
accuracy (Maki, Shields, Wheeler, & Zacchilli, 2005; Schraw, 2009).  Three common 
measures were chosen:  (a) calibration accuracy and (b) the bias score as measures of 
absolute accuracy, and (c) Gamma as a measure of relative accuracy. 
Absolute accuracy, also known as calibration, is described as the degree of fit 
between a person’s probability judgments of performance and his or her overall 
performance (Keren, 1991; Maki et al., 2005).  Investigations of absolute accuracy often 
have included measures of accuracy before and after performance on a comprehension 
test.  Readers make predictive comprehension judgments following the reading of text 
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and prior to answering test questions about it, with the purpose of predicting 
comprehension as measured by performance on the test, for example, “What percentage 
of items on this test of comprehension do you think you will get correct?”  Posttest 
confidence judgments are made after answering questions on the text with the purpose of 
judging actual performance on the answered questions, for example, “What percentage of 
items on this test do you think you got correct?   
The absolute value of the difference between judged and actual performance 
provides a measure of the magnitude of accuracy (i.e., calibration accuracy), with values 
closer to zero indicating perfect accuracy (Hacker, Bol, & Keener, 2008).  Some 
researchers (e.g, Yates, 1990) have proposed the use of the Brier (or quadratic) score as a 
measure of calibration accuracy, which is calculated by squaring the difference between 
judged and actual performance, because this has been adjusted to better predict 
probabilities of outcomes (Brier, 1950).  However, the Brier score contains components 
in addition to calibration (e.g., refinement) (Blattenberger & Lad, 1985) and may 
therefore be a hybrid measure of accuracy (Schraw, 2009); therefore, in the present study, 
calibration accuracy was measured more simply using the absolute value of the difference 
between judgments of performance and actual performance.   
The bias score has been included in the present study as another measure of 
absolute accuracy, because it provides information about absolute accuracy that differs 
from the magnitude of accuracy.  Bias is calculated as the signed difference between 
prediction and performance, and this provides a measure of overconfidence or 
underconfidence, with negative values indicating underconfidence and positive values 
indicating overconfidence.  With posttest confidence judgments, there have been 
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interesting and somewhat counter-intuitive results found regarding systematic 
overconfidence or underconfidence in the judgments.  An observed effect has become 
known as the “hard-easy effect” wherein difficult test items tend to produce 
overconfident judgments whereas easy items tend to produce underconfident judgments 
(Kleiter, Doherty, & Brake, 2003; Suantak, Bolger, & Ferrell, 1996), although the 
reasons for the effect are still a matter of dispute (cf. Juslin, Winman, & Olsson, 2000).  
And in another study, verbal ability was linked to levels of confidence:  Readers with 
higher verbal ability were underconfident in judging performance on hard texts, whereas 
other readers showed little over- or underconfidence on hard texts and were generally 
quite accurate for easy texts (Maki et al., 2005).   
Absolute accuracy, whether measured by a form of calibration accuracy or the 
bias score, tends to be more accurate on posttest confidence judgments than predictive 
judgments of comprehension.  This is likely due in part to the increased specificity of 
posttest judgments (Hacker, Bol, Horgan, & Rakow, 2000; Maki, 1998) and this has been 
referred to as the testing effect (Pressley & Ghatala, 1990). 
Relative accuracy has been the primary measure of metacomprehension of text 
(Dunlosky & Lipko, 2007).  Relative accuracy measures the degree to which a person’s 
judgments can predict the likelihood of correct performance of one item relative to 
another (Nelson, 1984).  Procedurally, judgments of relative accuracy are obtained by 
asking readers subsequent to reading a text and prior to being tested for comprehension of 
the text, “How confident are you that you can answer questions about the text?”  
Participants provide their confidence judgment from 0% confident to 100% confident.  
The confident judgments are then correlated with performance.  The statistic commonly 
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used to correlate confidence with performance is the Goodman-Kruskal gamma 
coefficient (G), with 0 indicating chance, -1 indicating poor accuracy, and +1 indicating 
perfect accuracy.  Perfect accuracy means that for every time a person gave high 
confidence judgment in knowing a question, he or she knew the answer, and for every 
time a person gave a low confidence judgment, he or she did not know the answer.   
Although the use of G in studies of metacomprehension has typically not been 
sensitive to individual differences, such as verbal ability, and has not shown strong 
reliability (Masson & Rotello, 2009), it has remained the measure of choice for relative 
accuracy because it has been shown to be a meaningful measure of accuracy by cross-
validating it with other measures of accuracy.  In contrast, measures of absolute accuracy 
have shown sensitivity to individual differences and stronger reliability.  In some 
instances, the reliability of absolute accuracy has exceeded the reliability of test 
performance (Hacker et al., 2000). 
People can provide accurate measures of absolute accuracy but not relative 
accuracy.  For example, a person might make a judgment that he or she will get 80% of 
the items on a test correct and get 80% correct (i.e., perfect calibration accuracy), but do 
very poorly at judging exactly which items are correct or incorrect (i.e., a person does not 
discriminate well between what is known or not known).  Maki et al. (2005) have shown 
that there are weak relations between absolute and relative accuracy, leading these 
researchers to conclude that “these two types of metacognition tap different processes” 
(p. 728).    
Metacomprehension judgments, whether relative or absolute, can be helpful in 
improving comprehension.  As a predictive judgment, when students judge that they have 
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not understood a text prior to a test, they can then reread for improved understanding.  As 
a postdictive judgment following a test, when students judge that they have not 
performed well on particular test items, they can emphasize those particular topics in 
future study or revisit the test question.  The judgment of not understanding is the result 
of metacognitive monitoring, and rereading is the result of metacognitive control (Nelson 
& Narens, 1990), both aspects of metacognition being essential ingredients of self-
regulation of study (Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999).  Effective self-regulation of study 
requires that predictive judgments of comprehension are accurate.  
Unfortunately, studies of both absolute and relative measures of 
metacomprehension have shown only moderate levels of accuracy.  However, researchers 
are exploring interventions using strategies that appear to improve readers’ relative 
accuracy by encouraging deeper engagement with the text; for example, accuracy was 
significantly improved by summarizing (Thiede & Anderson, 2003), applying self-
explanation strategies while reading (Griffin, Wiley, & Thiede, 2008), or simply 
rereading texts (Rawson, Dunlosky, & Thiede, 2000).  To match judgments more closely 
to the content with the goal of improving predictive power, researchers have used term-
specific judgments regarding a few main concepts that appear in the texts, which helps to 
specify the nature of the prediction (Dunlosky & Lipko, 2007). 
Similarly, other researchers have been exploring interventions to improve 
absolute accuracy.  Schraw, Potenza, and Nebelsick-Gullet (1993) found that incentives 
for calibration accuracy increased calibration accuracy and performance.  Hacker et al. 
(2008) investigated the impact of extrinsic incentives and reflection on college students’ 
calibration judgments and accuracy on exam performance, as well as relationships 
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between explanatory style and calibration.  Their results indicated that achievement level 
was associated with calibration accuracy.  Higher-achieving students were very accurate 
in their calibrations and were less affected by incentives and reflection.  Lower-achieving 
students were less accurate in calibration but showed significant improvement in 
accuracy when incentives were offered.  Also, Koku and Qureshi’s (2004) research 
further supports the findings related to calibration accuracy and achievement. They assert 
that high-performing students are more likely to recognize the extent and limitation of 
their knowledge, while low-performing students have limited insight into their 
performance. They suggest using an intervention that requires students to respond to and 
justify each question response, theorizing that this will increase student metacognitive 
processes and thereby result in increased calibration accuracy and improved performance.   
Comprehension is an important part of metacomprehension, and the construction-
integration model is relevant to both because interpreting the meaning of any 
metacomprehension judgment arguably depends on the level of comprehension being 
tested (Wiley et al., 2005).  Our knowledge of metacomprehension will be better 
informed by knowing more about the influence of levels of comprehension, especially the 
inferences that contribute to the level of the situation model, which may provide the best 
representation of text comprehension (Graesser et al., 1997; Kintsch, 1994).  There has 
been some related research examining accuracy of metacomprehension with tests or texts 
of varying difficulty.  Using relative accuracy of predictive judgments, Weaver and 
Bryant (1995) examined the effect of text difficulty on judgments of comprehension 
using narrative and expository types of texts, and they found with both types of texts that 
subjects were most accurate (using G scores) with texts of moderate difficulty, with lower 
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accuracy for both easy and difficult texts.  They termed this the optimum effort hypothesis 
because it may indicate that readers choose a moderate level of effort required for a task, 
or set of related tasks, and this is generally the most efficient approach for maximum 
overall accuracy.  These findings are similar to the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic 
(Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) in which people tend to use some 
value as a starting point, or anchor, in making estimates over a set of related tasks, and 
then tend to make insufficient adjustments from this anchor in making successive 
estimates.  In other words, the optimum effort hypothesis may imply that readers choose 
a moderate estimate as the initial anchor, at least with predictive judgments, and then 
insufficiently adjust from this anchor when judging easier and more difficult texts.   
Scheck, Meeter, and Nelson (2004) examined anchoring with the absolute 
accuracy of immediate versus delayed judgments of learning.  They tested the results 
against three hypotheses:  (a) the anchoring hypothesis, proposing an extreme anchor that 
does not change; (b) the monitoring hypothesis, proposing that monitoring is solely 
responsible for judgments and there will be no anchor effect; (c) the dual-factors 
hypothesis, proposing that both anchoring and monitoring will occur to some degree, 
meaning, there will be evidence of an anchor although subjects will make (imperfect) 
adjustments to their judgments due to monitoring—a proposal that is very similar to the 
anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic.  The dual-factors hypothesis was consistent with 
their results. 
Also using relative accuracy of predictive judgments, Zaromb, Karpicke, and 
Roediger (2010) examined the effect of sentence difficulty (hard or easy) with judgments 
of either comprehension or learning and found in either case that subjects’ confidence 
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was greatest with easy sentences, regardless of experimental conditions that manipulated 
the use of effort after meaning (i.e., completing the tasks with or without clues).  Zaromb 
et al. also manipulated recall performance with two types of clues (embedded or delayed) 
and a control group who received no clues.  Based on levels of confidence, subjects 
appeared to be unaware of the manipulation, which significantly enhanced recall 
performance.  Therefore, predictive relative accuracy as measured by correlations 
between judgments and recall performance was greatest in the control condition, with 
lower accuracy in the embedded-clue condition and very low accuracy (no significant 
correlations) in the delayed-clue condition.  Nevertheless, despite the subjects’ inability 
to detect the benefits of the manipulation, the findings suggest that the subjects were able 
to monitor the differences in text difficulty and their own related level of comprehension 
to a significant degree.  It may be that the subjects had chosen a more typical anchor in 
the context of reading for making their judgments (i.e., the control condition with no 
clues), and the subjects’ predictive accuracy in the experimental conditions appeared to 
suffer in comparison.  These findings as well as the implications of the optimum effort 
hypothesis (Weaver & Bryant, 1995) suggest that using relative accuracy, readers make 
judgments of metacomprehension with anchors that reflect typical expectations or 
moderate levels of difficulty related to texts—and a moderate level of difficulty may be a 
typical expectation, depending on the circumstances and information available. 
Using the absolute accuracy of posttest judgments, Schraw et al. (1993) found that 
subjects were more accurate in their calibration accuracy on easy tests compared with 
difficult tests and they suggested that subjects performed more consistently on easy 
items.  Therefore, there was a stronger correspondence with those judgments.  Another 
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interpretation could be the finding that people often use 75% as a self-chosen anchor to 
estimate a moderate probability of success (Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Hacker & Bol, 
2011), because mean performance on the easy tests in the study by Schraw et al. was 
about 75% and mean performance on the difficult tests was about 46%.  Scraw et al. 
(1993) also found that subjects were generally overconfident on difficult tests and 
underconfident on easy tests, replicating the hard-easy effect.  Because of this study’s use 
of posttest judgments, the findings from it were especially relevant to the present study in 
which I sought to use the levels of comprehension discussed previously as a way to 
investigate readers’ ability to monitor their comprehension at each of these levels using 
posttest judgments. 
Expository and Narrative Texts 
Different genres of texts present differing characteristics and instructional 
implications.  Although there are many approaches in the literature to defining the 
construct of “genre” (Johns, 2002), for the present study, it is sufficient to consider the 
two “macro-genres” of narrative and expository texts (Grabe, 2002).  Expository texts 
may be broadly defined here as informational in nature, where the author intends to 
explain or define something to the reader using some type of prose.  Narrative texts may 
be broadly defined as storytelling in nature, where the author intends to describe a 
sequence of events that may include fiction and/or nonfiction using a story structure that 
includes a protagonist, goals, and outcomes. 
Comparing these genres, narrative discourse in general appears to be more 
common at a younger age than expository discourse (Berman & Katzenberger, 2004).  
Following from the informational nature of expository texts, specific prior knowledge 
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influences the comprehension of expository texts, whereas narrative text is influenced 
more by general world knowledge that often relates in some way to common experiences 
(Best, Floyd, & McNamara, 2008; Wolfe & Mienko, 2007).  Consistent with these 
findings, narrative texts appear to be generally easier to comprehend than expository texts 
(Best, Floyd, & McNamara, 2008; Weaver & Bryant, 1995).   
Also, Weaver and Bryant (1995) found that predictive metacomprehension 
accuracy differed by type of text and question.  For expository texts, accuracy was better 
for detail-oriented questions as compared with thematic questions; for narrative texts, 
accuracy was better for the thematic questions.  According to the construction-integration 
model (Kintsch, 1998), the detail-oriented questions should apply most to textbase 
comprehension, whereas thematic questions are types of inferences that should apply to a 
situation model level of comprehension.  In other words, predictive metacomprehension 
accuracy for questions related to a situation model level of comprehension was better for 
the narrative texts than expository texts.   
Despite the challenges presented by expository texts, current metacomprehension 
research has focused on them because of their important role in educational contexts 
(Wiley et al., 2005).   However, because relatively little research has been conducted 
using narrative texts and because of their unique strengths over expository texts (e.g., 
easier comprehension), the present study uses them to explore comprehension and 
metacomprehension.  Moreover, the narrative texts that have been used in previous 
research (a) have been short, consisting of about 100 to 200 words, (b) have been 
contrived in their construction so that propositions needed to generate inferences, whether 
automatic or generative, were placed in contiguous sentences, with little or no intervening 
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propositions, and (c) presented a limited number of antagonists or protagonists who were 
involved in very simple themes.  The narrative texts used in the present research are 
longer, each being 600 words long, have propositions necessary for making inferences 
spaced out across the text with one or more sentences not directly relevant to the 
inference intervening between the propositions, and have several characters that are 
engaged in more complex and realistic themes. 
Pupil Size and Cognitive Effort 
 To examine further subjects’ difficulties in answering the three types of question, 
I introduced into the main study an examination of pupil size of each subject over the 
course of the experiment based on research that pupil size positively correlates with 
cognitive effort or demands (e.g., Ahern, 1978; Ahern & Beatty, 1979; Beatty, 1982).  
Although the method of examining pupil size as an indicator of cognitive effort over the 
course of a process such as problem-solving is still a matter of discussion (Cook, Zheng, 
& Blaz, 2009; Just & Carpenter, 1993; Xie & Salvendy, 2000), there is evidence provided 
by Just and Carpenter (1993) that peak amplitude for each task is a primary correlate of 
cognitive effort, and therefore I measured the peak amplitude for each task. 
Research Questions 
 The purpose of the present research was to further integrate the investigation of 
comprehension with metacomprehension by examining how accurately readers monitor 
their comprehension at varying levels of difficulty.  To provide converging evidence of 
cognitive effort, response time (or latency) and pupil width were measured during the 
assessment.  To measure comprehension, questions were presented that assess 
comprehension at three levels:  (a) textbase, (b) situation model, temporal ordering (low 
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difficulty inferences), and (c) situation model, propositional logic (high difficulty 
inferences).  To measure metacomprehension, subjects provided prospective confidence 
judgments regarding their performance on each section of text and retrospective 
confidence judgments regarding their performance on each recently-answered question 
(i.e., immediate posttest judgments).  The main research questions related to 
metacomprehension were limited to the posttest judgments because of their paired 
relationship to the individual questions.  
My research questions addressed both comprehension and metacomprehension.  
The questions related to comprehension were:  (a) Will performance in percent correct 
vary by question type with literal questions being the easiest and propositional logic 
questions being the most difficult?; (b) Will response time in milliseconds per character 
vary by question type with literal questions having the shortest and propositional logic 
questions having the longest?; and (c) Will maximum amplitude of pupil size vary by 
question type with propositional logic questions having the largest and literal questions 
the smallest? 
I expected to find that inferential questions would be more difficult to answer than 
literal questions, and of the two types of inferential questions, the propositional logic 
questions will be the most difficult.  In other words, literal questions should be the 
easiest, followed by temporal ordering questions, and propositional logic questions 
should be the most difficult.  This ordering by level of difficulty should be evidenced by 
a decrease in performance with increased difficulty.  In addition, this ordering by level of 
difficulty should be evidenced by increased response time and increased pupil size.  The 
questions related to comprehension served as a manipulation check to verify that the 
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design of the question types produced the expected results.   
The questions related to metacomprehension were:  (a) Will the magnitude of 
metacognitive posttest confidence judgments vary by question type with confidence 
being greatest for judgments related to literal questions and lowest for judgments related 
to propositional logic questions?; (b) Will posttest measures of calibration accuracy vary 
by question type with greatest accuracy for the question type that was answered closest to 
a moderate anchor of success and with decreasing accuracy for question types that move 
away from this anchor?; (c) Will bias vary by question type with the greatest 
overconfidence related to difficult questions (propositional logic) and the least 
overconfidence (or underconfidence) related to easy questions (literal)?; and (d) Will 
levels of relative accuracy (G) remain consistent across question types? 
Confidence in judging comprehension should vary with question difficulty 
because there already exists evidence that readers can monitor their level of 
comprehension to a significant degree (Zaromb et al., 2010).  Thus, the magnitudes of 
posttest confidence judgments will be greatest for literal questions and less for inferential 
questions, with confidence lowest for propositional logic questions.    
Subjects were also expected to anchor on an estimate of moderate success that 
may correspond roughly with 75%—or its equivalent (Hacker & Bol, 2011).  The 
subjects in this study did not use numbers to make confidence judgments.  Rather, they 
made judgments on a continuous scale between no confidence and total confidence, and 
these judgments were later transformed into values between 25 and 100% because no 
confidence, or guessing behavior, should produce 25% accuracy by chance given a four-
choice format.  Therefore, a spatial estimate of 75% on the scale in this study was defined 
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in numeric terms as 81.25—or about 81%, given that these are rough estimates.  
Calibration accuracy was predicted to be most accurate for the question type that was 
answered closest to 81%, with decreasing accuracy for question types that move away 
from this anchor.   
Based on the hard-easy effect observed with posttest judgments, bias was 
predicted to show the greatest overconfidence with difficult questions (propositional 
logic) and the least overconfidence (or underconfidence) with easy questions (literal).  
Overconfidence, in general, was expected because this is a prevalent finding in studies of 
metacomprehension and bias. 
Finally, it was already predicted that subjects should adjust their confidence 
judgments to compensate for varying levels of question difficulty and that these 
adjustments should be inadequate in terms of scale.  Therefore, it was predicted that 
relative accuracy (G) should not vary by question type because the insufficiency of 
adjustments in terms of scale will not affect relative accuracy as long as the adjustments 
move in the right direction (see the first prediction related to metacomprehension).  In 
other words, subjects should monitor to some degree whether one question is more or less 
difficult than other questions, regardless of its question type, and adjust their confidence 
judgments accordingly (i.e., relative accuracy), because relative accuracy is only 
concerned with whether questions are more or less difficult.  The size of the adjustments 
made between confidence judgments only affects absolute accuracy.













The present study used a mixed design to investigate text comprehension and 
metacomprehension.  Specifically, this was a (6 x 3) within-subject design with six trial 
positions and three question types, both repeated measures. 
Subjects 
One hundred and twenty-seven subjects from the Educational Psychology subject 
pool participated to satisfy 1 hour of their research participation requirement.  Of these, 7 
subjects did not speak English as a first language.  Therefore, their data were not included 
in the analysis, leaving a sample of 120 subjects.  The subjects were college students with 
a mean age of 24.4 years (SD = 6.43).  Of the 120 subjects, 95 were female and 108 were 
Caucasian/White, 6 were Hispanic/Latina, 3 were African American/Black, 1 was Asian, 1 
was American Indian, and 1 was self-identified as “other”). 
Hardware and Software 
Personal Computer (PC) with Windows 
A PC with Windows XP as the operating system was used to run the eyetracking 
hardware and software necessary for the experiment.  The PC had a standard keyboard, 
mouse, and an SVGA monitor running at a resolution of 1280x1024. 
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Eye Tracker 
An Arrington eye tracker attached to the PC with an internal PCI card measured 
pupil size during the assessment.  Other pupillometric data such as eye position was 
recorded for later reference but was not used in this study.  A version of ViewPoint 
software (developed by Arrington Research) recorded pupillometric data that were 
coordinated with the automated assessment program designed to display the materials 
and record data related to performance, judgments, response time, response time in 
milliseconds per character when applicable, and other details.     
Automated Assessment 
The Automated Assessment of Reading Comprehension and Metacomprehension 
Using Narratives (AARCMUN) program was designed by the author (with programming 
assistance from Dr. John Kircher) to present the assessment to the subjects.  The narrative 
stories as well as metacomprehension judgments and comprehension questions were 
developed during Pilot Studies 1 and 2.  
Log Analysis 
A software program was designed in FORTRAN by the author to read the log 
files created by the AARCMUN program, do the necessary calculations, and provide the 
dependent variables for each subject in comma-delimited files for analysis, as well as 
providing a file designed to be read by the MCT Analysis program (see below). 
MCT Analysis 
A software program was designed in FORTRAN by the author to read text files 
containing multiple-choice test (MCT) data and then conduct an analysis of items.  This 
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analysis included all items and trial positions, providing performance for each subject on 
particular items and a discrimination score for each item to check for problematic ones 
(i.e., items with a negative discrimination value would indicate that high-performing 
subjects did more poorly on those items than low-performing subjects). 
Pilot Study 1 
To develop an assessment that would measure textbase and situation model levels 
of comprehension using narrative texts, I conducted a pilot study to test literal and 
inferential levels of comprehension, using propositional logic questions (i.e., inferences 
that may best indicate situation model development; Kintsch, 1998).  However, due to the 
difficulty in constructing a sufficient number of propositional logic questions, temporal 
ordering questions were added to balance the number of literal and inferential questions 
and significant differences between the two types of inferential questions became 
apparent in the results.  
I developed relatively authentic texts by employing a top-down approach to 
writing them; therefore, the focus was placed on narrative qualities such as cohesive 
themes and meaningful beginnings and endings within each text and each section of text.  
The texts are provided in the Appendix, although the questions there were changed for 
the dissertation study (see Revisions to the Pilot Assessment).  There were no controls for 
factors such as the types and number of specific propositions or sentential structures.  
Each text was divided into three sections (200 words each) and shown to subjects one at a 
time on a computer monitor.  Subjects could navigate back and forth through the three 
sections of text.  Using entire sections of text allowed for more natural reading compared 
with more strictly controlled methods, such as presenting the text to the reader one 
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sentence at a time.   
Assumptions underlying the selections of narrative texts were twofold:  Popular 
books that were thought to be more engaging by virtue of their popularity, and unfamiliar 
texts were expected to provide a better opportunity for new learning at the level of the 
situation model than familiar ones.  As a compromise between these two competing 
assumptions, the least-known titles from a list of popular books were chosen.  A list of 
popular literature titles (based on titles available as Cliff notes) was developed into a 
questionnaire to which a person could indicate his or her level of familiarity on a six-
point likert scale, ranging from no familiarity to total familiarity.  Any titles associated 
with television programs or films were not included because of the increased chance of 
familiarity.  These familiarity questionnaires were completed by a convenience sample of 
undergraduate students (n = 74) enrolled in an educational psychology course as part of a 
teacher education program who volunteered to complete them.  
Based on the results of the questionnaires, six books were chosen:  Black Boy by 
Richard Wright; Black Elk Speaks by John G. Niehardt; Bless Me, Ultima by Rudolfo 
Anaya; Death Comes for the Archbishop by Willa Cather; Night by Elie Wiesel; and 
Steppenwolf by Hermann Hesse.  The six texts developed for the assessment were based 
on portions of these books and provided a simplified synopsis of the events.  In doing so, 
liberties were taken with respect to details and presentation.     
For assessing comprehension of the texts at the levels of textbase and situation 
model comprehension, six literal and six inferential questions were developed for each 
text.  For clarity, the title of the prior story was provided above each question in the 
assessment window; for example, “Based on ‘Richard and His Education,’ choose the 
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best answer (a or b) to complete the following statement.”  The questions were in two-
choice format and related to content distributed evenly across the three sections.  The 
literal questions included information found directly in the text.  For example, “daily life 
for Richard was made __________ in some very significant ways as a result of his self 
confidence”; and the choices were “easier” or “more difficult.” 
The six inferential questions consisted equally of two types:  temporal ordering 
and propositional logic.  The temporal ordering questions were inferences of “time” that 
are believed to be generated automatically while reading narrative texts (Zwaan & 
Radvansky, 1998).  For example, “Richard moved in 1925 to Memphis, and this led 
eventually to a time when he __________”; and the choices were “met a man named 
Shorty” or “began to experience persecution.” 
The propositional logic questions were modeled after the general form of modus 
ponens logic (or occasional instances of its negation) because this is a common logical 
form that has been previously applied by Franks (1997) and Lea (1995).  Modus ponens 
makes use of a rule of inference, such that:  If P, then Q.  P.  Therefore, Q.  An example 
is:  If today is Saturday, then I will sleep late.  Today is Saturday.  Therefore, I will sleep 
late.  For example, “according to the advice of Richard’s family, Shorty was doing the 
__________ thing by accepting his mistreatment”; and the choices were “right” and 
“wrong.” 
Given the results of other studies using different methods that examined online 
processing in a similar context,  I predicted that the literal questions would be easiest to 
answer, followed first by the temporal ordering questions and then by the propositional 
logic questions in order of increasing difficulty.  Subject response times were recorded as 
  28 
 
a rough measure of cognitive effort, and response times were calculated in milliseconds 
per character due to variability in question length (M = 130.1 and SD = 16.2).  To make 
the different types of questions sufficiently similar to the reader with respect to length, 
mean question lengths within each text were made similar across all question types. 
The comprehension assessment was piloted using 39 undergraduate students who 
participated to satisfy a research requirement for an educational psychology course.  
Thirty-five were female, and 34 were white with 5 being Asian.  The mean age was 25.3 
years (SD = 8.79).  Subjects were told in the consent form and verbally after signing it 
that they would be reimbursed 10 cents for every question answered correctly (with a 
max of 72 questions, or $7.20).  This was done in order to motivate task engagement.  
The test was administered by a computer program developed in FORTRAN by the 
author.  Text order was randomized by subject, question order was randomized for each 
text, and the position of correct responses (i.e., choice a or b) was also randomized.  To 
clear the subject’s working memory of textual information and promote assessment of 
subject’s long-term memory of the text, an intervening number Stroop task lasting about 
two minutes, M = 1.9, SD = .17, was completed between each text and the questions 
following it. 
Results of the pilot study confirmed my predictions about the difficulty of the 
questions.  I conducted a repeated measures analysis of variance (RM-ANOVA) to 
examine effects related to question type and trial position and including percent correct 
and response time in milliseconds per character as dependent variables.  Greenhouse-
Geisser was reported for univariate tests (with one exception described below), and all 
analyses were conducted with an alpha level of .05.  The first trial was treated as a 
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practice trial and omitted from the following analysis. 
The univariate tests showed a significant main effect of question type with percent 
correct, F(1.8, 3798.0) = 9.84, p = .001., η 2 = .21, and response time, F(1.8, 3798.0) = 
58.86, p = .001., η 2 = .61, with response time having a much larger effect than percent 
correct.  Pairwise comparisons showed that the propositional logic inferences were 
significantly more difficult than temporal ordering as measured by a decrease in percent 
correct:  propositional logic M = 75.73 and SD = 9.97, temporal ordering M = 80.51 and 
SD = 14.38, p = .034, and they required more cognitive processing as measured by an 
increase in response time in ms/character: propositional logic M = 96.54 and SD = 21.33, 
temporal M = 86.57 and SD = 18.38, p = .001.  The temporal ordering questions were 
more difficult than literal questions as measured by a decrease in percent correct, but this 
difference was only approaching significance:  temporal ordering M = 78.1 and SD = 
10.34, literal M = 84.0 and SD = 9.65, p = .056.  And as expected given the larger effect 
size associated with response time, temporal ordering questions required significantly 
more cognitive processing than literal questions as measured by an increase in response 
time in ms/character: temporal ordering M = 91.06 and SD = 18.62, literal M = 73.65 and 
SD = 16.11, p = .001.  These results confirmed most expectations and this was considered 
encouraging given a small sample size; however, some revisions were needed, and these 
revisions served as the basis for the second pilot study.  
Revisions to the Pilot Assessment 
Based on the results of the pilot study, I made several changes to the assessment 
in preparation for the main study.  First, to improve the assessment of comprehension, the 
three question types were balanced by generating three questions of each type for each of 
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the three sections of text.  Second, the two-choice (true-false) format of the 
comprehension questions was increased to a four-choice multiple-choice format to reduce 
the effects of chance from 50% to 25%.  Three, prompts for the metacomprehension 
judgments were added.  Four, the number Stroop task was removed because with the 
addition of the metacomprehension task, the many tasks became an impractical burden 
for the subject who in addition to reading six 600-word texts, also made 18 or more 
predictive comprehension judgments, and answered 54 comprehension questions with 54 
posttest confidence judgments in one session. 
Other revisions were made to the questions in order to address the possibility that 
differences between question types in the pilot study were due to either the extra retrieval 
necessary to generate the inferences or to differences in question content.  The generation 
of some propositional logic inferences in the pilot study required the retrieval of two 
propositions in addition to generating the inference (either while reading the text or 
answering the question, the timing or necessity of generation was not established), 
whereas the other questions each required the retrieval of one basic proposition.  To 
control for this in the main study, the propositional logic questions were revised if 
necessary to have enough of the information necessary to the inference given in the 
question so that the retrieval of one proposition would be sufficient to successfully 
answer the question.  For example, in the story Black Elk and His Visions, the original 
question was, “Black Elk began to hear voices in a new and extraordinary way for the 
first time around the year __________”; and the choices were “1867” and “1875.”  This 
required the reader to know as stated in the text (a) that Black Elk was born in 1863 and 
(b) that the visions began when he was 4 years old.  The question was revised to read, 
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“Black Elk began to hear supernatural voices for the first time at the age of four, 
sometime around the year __________,” so that remembering the year of his birth should 
be sufficient to answer the question.   
With these revisions, it may be assumed that differences between literal and 
inferential types of questions in the main study will be due to the extra cognitive 
processing required for the generation of inferences rather than simply extra retrieval, 
although the specific timing of inference generation remains unclear.  If some inferences 
are made online and others offline, the more difficult inferences are more likely to be 
made offline (Graesser et al., 2007) when answering the related question, adding to the 
reader’s response time following that question and appropriately facilitating the detection 
of difficult questions with the measure of response time. 
Finally, to examine the effects of question content, a literal-only version of the 
revised assessment was created in which the general content of the inferential questions 
was transformed into literal questions.  This version was tested in the second pilot study. 
Pilot Study 2 
I conducted the second pilot study to check for potential differences in difficulty 
between question types due to question content.  Because each of the questions made 
reference to different parts of the relevant story, content that was difficult to grasp or 
unfamiliar to the subject could produce differences in cognitive processing.  The 
questions now consisted of three types of literal questions:  literal (the same literal 
questions from the first pilot study), literal questions derived from the temporal-ordering 
questions, and literal questions derived from the propositional logic questions.  Any 
differences in difficulty among the questions should be due to question content and not to 
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the added effects from inferential processing.  For example, the propositional logic 
question discussed earlier that requires knowledge of Black Elk’s year of birth was 
revised to read, “According to the story, Black Elk was an Oglala Lakota who was born 
sometime during the year __________”; and the choices were “1853,” “1857,” “1863,” 
or “1867.” 
To expedite data collection, this test was administered to a convenience sample in 
the same manner as was done with the topic familiarity questionnaires in the first pilot 
study:  Undergraduate students (n = 37) in an educational psychology course volunteered 
to participate in the group task after class.  Subjects volunteered with no compensation 
and no demographic or personal information were collected.  The test was administered 
in pen-and-paper format.  Therefore, response times for questions were not available and 
only the dependent variable of performance was examined.  However, the order of texts 
and questions was balanced with Latin squares using six versions of the test.   
Results showed that percent correct for each group of questions was similar:  
literal (M = .67, SD = .47), literal from temporal ordering (M = .71, SD = .45), and literal 
from propositional logic (M = .70, SD = .46).  I conducted a RM-ANOVA to examine the 
effects of question type using percent correct as the dependent variable and text order as a 
between-subjects factor.  Within-subject contrasts showed no significant effect for 
question type, F(2.0, 60.5) = .91, p = .41, η 2 = .03.  Given these results, it seems unlikely 
that differences observed in measures of difficulty among question types would be due to 
question content; in other words, differences among question types in the main study 
should be due to the type of cognitive processing required to answer the question. 
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Narrative Stories and Questions 
The protocol included six stories that were used in both pilot studies.  Each story 
was separated into three sections, with each section 200 words in length.  The three 
question types relating to the stories were developed in pilot studies 1 and 2:  (a) literal, 
(b) temporal ordering, and (c) propositional logic.  Each story had three of each question 
type for each section of text for a total of 9 questions per story, and a total of 54 for the 
entire protocol.  The order of the stories was counterbalanced between subjects using 
balanced Latin squares.  The questions and question choices were randomized except that 
the first question shown after a story was never from the third (and most-recently read) 
section of text.  The texts and questions have been provided in the Appendix. 
Measures 
The dependent variables used in the study were:  As a measure of reading 
comprehension for literal, temporal ordering, and propositional logic questions, percent 
of correct responses were reported as a function of trial position; cognitive effort was 
measured using response time and peak amplitude of pupil size for each task; and 
metacomprehension was measured using confidence judgments and performance to 
calculate both absolute and relative accuracy.   
Judgments of confidence in performance were made on a continuous scale from 
“no confidence (or guessing)” to “total confidence” with tick marks indicating spatial 
distance at repeated intervals like a ruler, except with no numbers given.  The scale was 
assumed to present interval properties due to the spatial intervals presented, however, this 
assumption of interval properties for the scale may be mistaken.  Later, these spatial 
choices were converted to numbers representing probabilities from 25% (chance) to 
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100%.  
Absolute metacognitive accuracy was measured in two ways:  bias and calibration 
accuracy.  A bias score was calculated for each subject by subtracting actual performance 
from the pretest or posttest confidence judgments, summing these differences, and then 
taking the mean of the summed differences.  The bias score (or bias index) provides a 
signed difference of accuracy, with negative values indicating underconfidence, positive 
values indicating overconfidence, and 0 as perfect absolute accuracy.  The equation for 
bias is: 
                    n 
Bias  =  1/n ∑ (ci – pi)     
                  i = 1 
Absolute metacognitive accuracy, or calibration accuracy, was calculated as a 
magnitude of accuracy for each subject in a similar fashion, but taking the mean of the 
absolute value of each of the differences between confidence and performance.  With the 
exception that this produces all positive values, this measure of absolute accuracy can be 
interpreted similarly to bias, with 0 indicating perfect accuracy and increasing values 
indicating increasing inaccuracy.  The equation for calibration accuracy is: 
                       n 
Calibration accuracy =  1/n ∑ | ci – pi | 
                                           i = 1 
 Relative accuracy was measured for each subject using the Goodman-Kruskal 
(1954) gamma correlation.  The gamma correlation is a nonparametric statistic that has 
been widely used to calculate relative metacognitive accuracy (Masson & Rotello, 2009).  
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Gamma provides an ordinal association between two measures.  In the present study, 
gamma was used to measure the extent to which an individual’s high or low confidence 
across items was associated with his or her high or low performance, respectively.  
Gamma correlations range from +1.0 to -1.0, with a correlation of 0 representing an 
association that is no better than chance.   
For each subject, cognitive effort was measured using the mean response time in 
milliseconds per character for every task requiring a response; likewise, the peak 
amplitude of pupil size was calculated for each subject and task.  Noise was filtered from 
the pupil data in the following way.  A minimal number of samples identified by the 
ViewPoint program as problematic were removed.  Samples where the pupil aspect was 
less than or equal to .5 were removed as blinks.  Samples greater than three standard 
deviations from the mean of the remaining data were removed as noise.  Using this 
method, the percentage of data removed for all subjects was considered acceptable, M = 
4.66, SD = 4.81.   
Procedure 
There was one session for each subject lasting about an hour.  Following the 
process of informed consent, the computerized assessment collected demographic 
information.  Then, before beginning the main assessment, subjects read the following 
instructions: 
You will be reading six short stories and each story will be shown in three 
sections.  You can return to each story section as many times as you wish 
except you cannot return to a story after you begin answering the 
questions.  Before answering the questions, you will judge your 
confidence in being able to correctly answer questions related to each 
section of the story on a continuous scale from TOTAL CONFIDENCE to 
NO CONFIDENCE (or guessing) in the following manner: 
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After reading each section of the story, you will judge your confidence 
related to that section:  “How confident are you that you can correctly 
answer the questions related to this section of the story?” 
 
Note:  if rereading causes you to make more than one judgment for a 
section or story, your most recent judgment will be used. 
 
After reading a story and making your predictions, you will be shown nine 
incomplete statements about the story and you will choose the best of four 
responses to complete them.  You can change your answer after clicking 
on (A), (B), (C), or (D), but once you click on the submit button, you 
cannot change it. 
 
After you submit an answer, you will judge your confidence in the chosen 
response; for example, “How confident are you that you just answered 
correctly?”  These confidence judgments will use the same scale as the 
others. 
 
Following the instructions, the subjects were shown a screen asking them to wait 
for nine seconds, with the number counting down as the seconds progressed.  Then the 
experiment began with the first section of text and proceeded as described in the 
instructions (see Table 2) and with a 9-second wait screen before viewing a new text.  
When the subject finished the assessment, the final screen provided a summary of test 
performance, general accuracy of metacomprehension judgments, an acknowledgment 
for the authors of the original books used to develop these stories, and the statement, 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The first trial was considered a practice trial and omitted from the following 
analyses.  To test for carryover effects with the six text orders (i.e., did a particular text 
order have either subtractive or additive effects on performance on subsequent texts), 
one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine the effects of text order as the 
independent variable with each dependent variable (DV).  The results showed no 
significance with text order for any of the DVs (smallest p = .34).   
Reliability of the DVs was calculated by estimating the consistency of 
performance across trials 2 through 6.  The reliability was moderate to high for each of 
the DVs related to comprehension:  percent correct, Cronbach’s Alpha (α) = .75; response 
time, α = .87; maximum pupil size, α = .99.  The reliability was also high for posttest 
confidence judgments, α = .91, and for each of the DVs related to absolute accuracy of 
metacomprehension for those judgments:  bias scores, α = .82; calibration accuracy, α = 
.81.   
However, as a measure of the relative accuracy of posttest judgments, the 
reliability of G scores was low, α = .15.  The low reliability may have been due, in part, 
to the elimination of 48 cases (40%) from the analysis when analyzing G by trial position.  
Comparing pretest and posttest judgments avoided missing cases, but the reliability of G 
scores was still low, α = .14.  The low reliability of G scores has been a typical problem 
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in metacomprehension research.  Nevertheless, as argued by Maki et al. (2005), it would 
be difficult to explain consistently positive G scores that imply some degree of successful 
monitoring by being significantly above zero as arising from random noise.  A one-
sample t-test showed that G scores for both pretest and posttest judgments in this study 
were significantly greater than zero:  pretest M = .11 and SD = .27, t(119) = 4.59, p = 
.001, η 2 = .15; posttest M = .52 and SD = .19, t(119) = 29.43, p = .001, η 2 = .88.  As 
typically seen in studies of metacomprehension that have shown the testing effect 
(Pressley & Ghatala, 1990), posttest accuracy was greater than pretest accuracy and a 
RM-ANOVA to examine the effect of pretest/posttest condition on relative accuracy (G), 
reporting Greenhouse-Geisser for the univariate test, showed the difference to be 
significant, F(1.0, 119.0) = 195.10, p = .001, η2 = .62.  Furthermore, comparing posttest 
scores with zero produced an impressive effect size (η 2 = .88).  Therefore, the relative 
accuracy (G) of posttest judgments that were focused on in this study presented 
compelling evidence that G may provide a meaningful measure despite its low reliability.   
In doing an item discrimination analysis, the higher- and lower-performing 
subjects were each defined as closely as possible to the higher and lower quartiles, 
respectively, resulting in 33 subjects in the upper quartile and 29 subjects in the lower 
quartile.  For each question, the mean percent correct of the lower performers was 
subtracted from the mean percent correct of the higher performers, producing a 
discrimination value between -100 and 100, with positive values indicating that the 
question properly discriminated between the higher and lower performers.  All 
discrimination values were positive, discrimination M = 28.05 and SD = 12.7.   
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Comprehension 
My research questions related to comprehension were:  (a) Will performance in 
percent correct vary by question type with literal questions being the easiest and 
propositional logic questions being the most difficult?; (b) Will response time in 
milliseconds per character vary by question type with literal questions having the shortest 
and propositional logic questions having the longest?; and (c) Will maximum amplitude 
of pupil size vary by question type with propositional logic questions having the largest 
and literal questions the smallest? 
To answer these questions, I conducted RM-ANOVAs to examine effects related 
to the repeated measures of question type and trial position (omitting the first trial), 
including percent correct, response time in milliseconds per character, and maximum 
amplitude of pupil size as dependent variables.  Greenhouse-Geisser statistics were 
reported for univariate tests, and all analyses were conducted with an alpha level of .05. 
The univariate tests showed a significant main effect of question type with percent 
correct, F(2.0, 235.5) = 16.13, p = .001., η 2 = .12, response time, F(1.9, 231.0) = 104.00, 
p = .001, η 2 = .47, and pupil size, F(1.6, 192.9) = 3.84, p = .031, η2 = .03.  As observed 
in the first pilot study, there was a larger effect size related to response time as compared 
with percent correct, and the measure of pupil size introduced for the main study 
presented the smallest effect size.   
Examining the measures of percent correct and response time by question type   
(see Table 3) with pairwise comparisons showed significance for all comparisons in the 
expected directions.  Propositional logic inferences were significantly more difficult than 
temporal ordering as measured by a decrease in percent correct, p = .01, and they  
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Table 3  
Means and Standard Deviations for Percent Correct, Response Time in ms/character,  
and Maximum Amplitude of Pupil Size by Question Type (n = 120) 
Question Type Percent 
Correct 
M (SD) 




of Pupil Size 
M (SD) 
Literal 74.94 (14.99)   96.40 (24.54) .1581 (.0409) 
Temporal Ordering 70.83 (18.15) 109.70 (26.56) .1583 (.0409) 
Propositional logic 66.94 (15.20) 118.05 (26.78) .1592 (.0402) 
 
required more cognitive processing as measured by an increase in response time in 
ms/character, p = .001.  Temporal ordering questions were significantly more difficult 
than literal questions as measured by a decrease in percent correct, p = .003, and they 
required more cognitive processing as measured by an increase in response time in 
ms/character, p = .001.  Examining the maximum amplitude of pupil size, propositional 
logic questions  required more cognitive effort than temporal ordering questions as 
indicated by an increase in pupil size, p = .01.  However, there was no significant 
difference between temporal ordering and literal questions, and this may have been 
related to the small effect size of this measure. 
Overall, the results related to comprehension supported predictions that 
propositional logic questions should be the most difficult, temporal ordering questions 
should be of moderate difficulty, and literal questions should be the easiest.  The only 
exception was that maximum amplitude of pupil size did not discriminate between literal 
and temporal ordering questions.  Nevertheless, the other two measures presented 
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significant differences as predicted and therefore, these results were considered sufficient 
to establish the relative difficulty of question types and proceed to examine their 
influence on metacomprehension. 
Metacomprehension 
The questions related to metacomprehension were:  (a) Will the magnitude of 
metacognitive posttest confidence judgments vary by question type with confidence 
being greatest for judgments related to literal questions and lowest for judgments related 
to propositional logic questions?; (b) Will posttest measures of calibration accuracy vary 
by question type with greatest accuracy for the question type that was answered closest to 
a moderate anchor of success and with decreasing accuracy for question types that move 
away from this anchor?; (c) Will bias vary by question type with the greatest 
overconfidence related to difficult questions (propositional logic) and the least 
overconfidence (or underconfidence) related to easy questions (literal)?; and (d) Will 
levels of relative accuracy (G) remain consistent across question types? 
To test these hypotheses, RM-ANOVAs were conducted to examine effects 
related to question type with the DVs of posttest confidence, G as a measure of relative 
accuracy, and bias or calibration accuracy scores as measures of absolute accuracy.  The 
first trial was omitted.  Nine cases were not analyzed due to missing data; therefore, the 
sample size for this analysis was 111.  The Greenhouse-Geisser statistic was reported for 
univariate tests and all analyses were conducted with an alpha level of .05.  Trial position 
was not included as a factor because calculating G scores by question type and trial 
position produced too many missing values that there were no cases (subjects) remaining 
for analysis, furthermore, there were no significant effects for trial position with percent 
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correct after removing the first trial, and comprehension as measured by correct 
responses serves as the basis for metacomprehension accuracy.  The missing values with 
G scores were due to the fact that the calculation of G ignores comparisons of equal 
values, therefore, small sets of judgments will sometimes present no variation and no G 
score can be calculated from them. 
It was predicted that the magnitude of posttest confidence judgments should be 
greatest for literal questions and less for inferential questions, with confidence lowest for 
propositional logic questions, and this was the case (see Table 4).  The univariate test for 
question type with magnitude of posttest confidence was significant, F(2.0, 215.9) = 
53.95, p = .001, η 2 = .33, and pairwise comparisons showed that these differences were 
significant between propositional logic and temporal ordering questions, p = .001, and 
between temporal ordering questions and literal questions, p = .005. 
 
Table 4  
Means and Standard Deviations for Magnitude of Posttest Confidence Judgments, 
Calibration Accuracy, Bias, and Relative Accuracy—G  


















Literal 76.68 (11.56) .31 (.11) .03 (.15) .54 (.34) 
Temporal 
Ordering 
75.23 (11.91) .34 (.12) .06 (.17) .53 (.37) 
Propositional 
Logic 
71.66 (11.77) .37 (.10) .05 (.17) .47 (.32) 
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As one measure of absolute accuracy, posttest calibration accuracy was predicted 
to be the most accurate for questions that subjects answered most closely to 81% of the 
time because this was a good numeric estimate of 75% of the spatial scale.  This was the 
case (see Tables 3 and 4).  Performance on literal questions was closest, followed by 
temporal ordering questions, and propositional logic questions were the farthest from this 
anchor, and then as predicted, calibration accuracy was greatest for judgments related to 
literal questions, followed by judgments related to temporal ordering and propositional 
logic questions.  The univariate test for question type with calibration accuracy was 
significant, F(1.9, 213.83) = 28.01, p = .001, η 2 = .20.  Pairwise comparisons showed 
that the difference between propositional logic and temporal ordering questions was 
significant, p = .002, and the difference between temporal ordering and literal questions 
was significant, p = .005. 
As another measure of absolute accuracy, posttest bias was predicted to vary by 
question type, showing the greatest overconfidence with difficult questions (propositional 
logic) and either the least overconfidence or underconfidence with easy questions 
(literal).  The univariate test for question type with bias scores was significant, F(2.0, 
219.03) = 3.83, p = .02, η 2 = .03.  The difference between temporal ordering and literal 
questions was in the correct direction and pairwise comparisons showed it to be 
significant, p = .007.  However, the difference between propositional logic and temporal 
ordering questions was not significant, p = .46 (see Table 4).  In other words, literal 
questions presented the least overconfidence, as predicted, but propositional logic and 
temporal ordering questions presented the most overconfidence in equal amounts.  With 
bias scores closer to zero indicating greater accuracy, a one-sample t-test was conducted 
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to compare these scores to zero and check for significant differences.  There were 
significant differences with small effect sizes for scores related to temporal ordering 
questions, t(119) = 3.04, p = .003, η 2 = .07, and propositional logic questions, t(119) = 
3.52, p = .001, η 2 = .09, meaning the subjects were slightly overconfident with these 
types of questions.  However, there was no significant difference for scores related to 
literal questions, t(119) = 1.65, p = .10, η 2 = .02, meaning the subjects showed virtually 
no bias (i.e., over- or underconfidence) with judgments related to literal questions. 
Finally, it was predicted that posttest relative accuracy as measured by G scores 
would not vary by question type because item-to-item performance at various levels of 
question difficulty would be consistent with item-to-item confidence.  This was the case 
(see Table 4).  The univariate test for question type with G scores was not significant, 
F(1.9, 211.47) = 1.37, p = .26, η 2 = .01.  Therefore, relative accuracy did not vary by 
question type.  In other words, as predicted, the subjects were moderately successful at 
monitoring the relative difficulty of items across varied levels of difficulty. 













The purpose of the present research was to integrate the investigation of 
comprehension with metacomprehension by examining subjects’ comprehension to 
establish that the question types varied in difficulty as expected, and then examining how 
accurately they monitored comprehension at each level of difficulty in their posttest 
judgments with both absolute and relative measures.  The results supported many of the 
expectations for comprehension and metacomprehension.  By integrating an examination 
of metacomprehension with varied levels of comprehension, this research has added to 
the literature by providing support to the premise that readers’ metacomprehension 
judgments can be accurate (Nelson & Narens, 1990) and that metacomprehension related 
to retrospective (posttest) judgments reflects appropriate differences in comprehension.  
In addition, the results provided evidence that changes in absolute accuracy by level of 
question difficulty may be attributed to the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic (Epley & 
Gilovich, 2006), as well as anchoring on a moderate estimate of success specifically 
(Hacker & Bol, 2011). 
For comprehension, I expected to find that inferential questions would be more 
difficult to answer than literal questions, and of the two types of inferential questions, the 
propositional logic questions would be the most difficult.  For the measures of percent 
correct and response time in milliseconds per character, these predicted relations were 
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supported. Response time provided a large effect size in discriminating question types, η 2 
= .47, and percent correct provided a smaller effect size but still substantial, η 2 = .12.   
With the measure of maximum amplitude of pupil size, the propositional logic 
questions were the most difficult, but there was no difference between temporal ordering 
and literal questions.  One practical implication of these results would be that pupil size 
data provided little extra to the study while requiring significant effort and expensive 
eyetracking equipment.  Future studies with this assessment may not benefit much from 
eyetracking technology, unless better ways were found to analyze pupil size or the 
method was expanded to include other pupillometric measures, such as time spent 
reading in particular areas of interest.  These additional measures may present stronger 
effect sizes. 
 Once the level of difficulty for the three question types had been addressed, 
question about metacomprehension could be addressed.  I expected confidence in judging 
comprehension should vary with question difficulty, with the magnitudes of posttest 
confidence judgments being greatest for literal questions and less for inferential 
questions, with confidence lowest for propositional logic questions.  Results supported 
this prediction.   With the large effect size of η 2 = .33, this indicates that the subjects 
were very successful at monitoring the relative difficulty of the questions.   
I had predicted that calibration accuracy, measured by the absolute value of the 
difference between judgments and performance, would be most accurate for the question 
type that was answered closest to 81%, with decreasing accuracy for question types that 
move from this anchor.  Results supported this prediction and with a large effect size, η 2 
= .20.  Performance on literal questions was closest to 81% correct, followed by temporal 
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ordering questions, and propositional logic questions were the farthest from this anchor.  
As predicted, calibration accuracy was greatest for judgments related to literal questions, 
followed by judgments related to temporal ordering and propositional logic questions.   
  Based on the hard-easy effect, I had predicted that bias would show the greatest 
overconfidence with the most difficult questions (propositional logic) and the least 
overconfidence with easy questions (literal).  Although the results showed a small effect 
size, η 2 = .03, the prediction had support.  As predicted, literal questions (i.e., the easiest 
questions) presented the least overconfidence—in fact, subjects showed virtually no bias 
with literal questions, and propositional logic (the most difficult questions) showed the 
greatest overconfidence.  Counter to the prediction, there was no significant difference in 
bias between temporal ordering and propositional logic questions.  Subjects showed 
greater overconfidence with temporal ordering questions in comparison to literal 
questions.  However, they did not show greater overconfidence with propositional logic 
questions in comparison to temporal ordering questions.  In other words, for some reason, 
there appeared to be similar levels of overconfidence with both types of inferences, 
although these question types appeared to differ in difficulty using multiple measures.  It 
is possible that subjects recognized the inferential nature of both temporal ordering and 
propositional logic questions as being difficult because they required more than simple 
memory (i.e., literal information) to answer, and that this recognition produced similar 
amounts of overconfidence for posttest judgments related to both question types, despite 
the fact that they were also related to significant differences in confidence judgments, 
calibration accuracy, and measures of comprehension. 
Finally, I had predicted that relative accuracy should not vary by question type 
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because the insufficiency of adjustments in terms of scale will not affect relative accuracy 
as long as the adjustments move in the right direction, i.e., appropriately indicating a 
greater or lesser probability of success.  This prediction also was supported.  There were 
no significant differences for relative accuracy among the three question types.  
Moreover, subjects showed relatively high accuracy for each question type (.54 for 
literal, .53 for temporal ordering, and .47 for propositional logic).   
Subjects in the current study adjusted the magnitudes of confidence in knowing 
questions directed at different levels of comprehension, with greater confidence given to 
literal questions that probe textbase levels of comprehension, less confidence to temporal 
ordering questions that probe inferences at a situation model level of comprehension, and 
even less confidence to propositional logic questions that probe inferences at a deeper 
level of the situation model.  In addition, absolute accuracy (i.e., the absolute value) was 
greatest for the literal questions, less so for temporal ordering questions, and the least for 
propositional logic questions.  In general, these results indicate that subjects were 
sensitive to question difficulty, but when calibrating their predictions to actual 
performance (i.e., absolute accuracy), their predictions appeared to be anchoring 
somewhere around a moderate estimate of success. 
The current study did provide some support for the hard-easy effect, which (using 
bias scores) has shown that readers are overconfident in answering difficult questions 
about text information and underconfident with easy questions.  Although Juslin, 
Winman, and Olsson (2000) have provided some rationale for this effect, it still remains 
an elusive finding.  Some research has shown the effect, whereas others have not.  The 
small effect size shown in the present study does not provide strong support of this 
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curious finding about metacomprehension, and suggests that more research is needed to 
clarify this relation between confidence and question difficulty.       
 Results also showed that relative accuracy did not vary significantly by question 
type.  This was consistent with the predicted nature of relative accuracy, i.e., the sizes of 
differences between judgments were unimportant and only the relative consistency of 
choices contributed to the measure.  Because of differences in the behavior of relative 
versus absolute accuracy, as mentioned frequently in the literature, absolute and relative 
accuracy appear to be measuring different aspects of metacognitive monitoring, for 
example, relative accuracy as measured by G appears to be relatively free from the 
effects of anchoring.  Unfortunately, G presented low reliability as often occurs in the 
literature.  Admittedly, a measure that is not reliable may not be valid, but I propose that 
it is possible for a measure with low reliability to still possess enough validity to be 
meaningful because there are consistent observations in the literature related to G scores, 
such as positive scores that are significantly different than zero, and posttest scores that 
are significantly greater than pretest scores.  Despite its low reliability, subjects’ relative 
accuracy provided evidence that they were monitoring differences in difficulty between 
items to a significant degree of success, and this evidence was more compelling with 
measures of absolute accuracy also presenting evidence of successful monitoring. 
Finally, I made a posthoc observation related to bias scores that the choice of 
scale as an appropriate estimation of probability was crucial for measuring over- and 
underconfidence.  Specifically, if subjects have a greater than zero probability of 
answering something correctly by chance, scales from 0 to 100 may deflate bias scores 
and transform small amounts of overconfidence into underconfidence.  This should 
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clearly be avoided.  For example, judgments in this study were measured on a scale from 
25 to 100 because there was a 25% chance on a four-choice test that a subject with no 
confidence would answer a question correctly by guessing.  In other studies, similar 
judgments have sometimes been placed on a scale from 0 to 100, but this will result in the 
deflation of bias scores.  Transforming the current data for purposes of illustration to a 
scale from 0 to 100 would make it appear that the subjects as a whole were 
underconfident with literal and propositional logic questions and almost perfectly 
accurate with temporal ordering questions (see Table 5).  Using a one-sample t-test to 
compare the bias scores to zero, there were significant differences for scores related to 
literal questions, t(119) = -3.55, p = .001, η 2 = .10, and propositional logic questions, 
t(119) = -2.44, p = .02, η 2 = .05.  However, there was no significant difference for scores 
related to temporal ordering questions, t(119) = -1.80, p = .074, η 2 = .03.  Given 
prevalent findings of overconfidence on tests as a general rule in metacomprehension, the 
deflated scale produces strange results here that would be difficult to explain. 
Table 5  
Means and Standard Deviations for Absolute Accuracy (Bias Score)  
With Posttest Judgments on a Scale of 0 to 100 by Question Type (n = 120) 
Question Type Posttest Bias Scores  
M (SD) 
Literal -.05 (.17) 
Temporal Ordering -.03 (.19) 
Propositional Logic -.04 (.18) 
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Limitations and Implications for Further Research 
This research was limited in several ways:  (a) the uncertainty of measuring 
online or offline comprehension, (b) the use of narrative texts, (c) factors uncontrolled in 
the comprehension test, (d) limited analysis of eyetracking data, (e) questions related to 
the scale of measurement for confidence judgments, and (f) the exploratory nature of the 
study.   
First, the study design required that subjects were asked questions about their 
comprehension of the text after reading the text and without the text available.  The 
answers to the questions may have been formulated online as the subjects were reading 
the texts or they may have been formulated offline only as a consequence of being probed 
by the question.  This has important implications for theories of comprehension, 
particularly pertinent to understanding inferential processing.  When inferences occur has 
been the focus a great deal of research, and unfortunately, the present study does not add 
to this research.  In future research, probing comprehension more proximally to reading 
will be necessary to shed light on this “when” question. 
Second, expository texts are more common in educational settings than narratives; 
therefore, it would be useful to repeat this method of research with expository texts to see 
whether subjects appear to monitor their comprehension in a similar way to that observed 
with narrative texts, for example, anchoring their calibration accuracy for posttest 
questions on moderate expectations of success.   
Third, the quality of the comprehension test could be improved.  Although the 
questions in the comprehension test were controlled in some important ways, other 
aspects remain to be considered.  Further testing could examine whether the overall test 
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might present enough reliability with less texts and questions to reduce the demands of 
the test.  Furthermore, each of the test questions could be reexamined more closely to 
control for issues related to its salience to the main character or the general plot, using 
one or more norming studies to estimate the relative levels of salience for each question. 
Fourth, only the maximum amplitude of pupil size was examined in this study but 
a wide range of pupillometric data can be examined with eyetracking technology.  Other 
measures of pupil size and other pupillometric measures (e.g., reading times with specific 
areas of interest) could be tested for ability to discriminate differing question types that 
have shown significant differences with larger effect sizes using other measures (i.e., 
percent correct, response time in milliseconds per character). 
Fifth, as a measurement issue, I have concluded that researchers should avoid 
deflating scores with scales of probability that set a minimum at zero—unless zero would 
be the expected probability of success with guessing, for example, a fill-in-the-blank 
assessment with no choices given.  However, it remains unclear whether a scale between 
no confidence and total confidence that does not show numbers to the subject but 
translates later to a probability between 25 and 100 would present similar results as a 
scale marked explicitly from 25 to 100.  Therefore, this point may be especially relevant 
to continuous scales that do not present explicit numbers, and future research could 
examine the effects of explicitly- and implicitly-numbered scales that predict probability 
of success. 
Sixth, although the study provided information about how levels of 
comprehension may influence different measures of metacomprehension, it does not say 
anything about the specific processes that may be used to make judgments of 
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metacomprehension.  It is likely with metacomprehension that one or more heuristics 
may be used to facilitate the making of confidence judgments (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974), such as the heuristics of availability (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002), 
retrieval fluency (Benjamin & Bjork, 1996), ease-of-processing (Begg, Duft, Lalonde, 
Melnick, & Sanvito, 1989), levels-of-disruption (Dunlosky, Rawson, & Hacker, 2002), or 
cue utilization (Koriat, 1997).  Perhaps methods can be developed to test predictions 
implied by these heuristics and how these heuristics might interact with differing levels 
of comprehension. 
Other research could examine the effectiveness of specific interventions to 
improve accuracy (including the reduction of the anchoring effect apparent in this study), 
delayed assessments of comprehension and metacomprehension as indicators of long-
term learning, or the effect of incentives on comprehension and metacomprehension. 
Conclusions 
This research provided a major contribution by showing that metacomprehension 
should not be treated as some monolithic process in which a reader either does or does 
not engage.  In the earliest studies of metacomprehension, researchers had measured 
metacomprehension by asking a single question about a text (see Glenberg, Wilkinson, & 
Epstein, 1982).  Although this was modified in later research to include multiple 
questions (see Maki & Berry, 1984), there was no consideration given to varying kinds of 
comprehension, such as comprehension at a textbase level or a situation model level.  
Most of the research on metacomprehension since 1985 has shown that readers are not 
very adept at monitoring their comprehension (for a review, see Maki, 1998).  One reason 
proposed for these poor results was that metacomprehension needs to be tied more 
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directly to comprehension to be able to fairly assess readers’ monitoring ability.  There 
have been recent attempts to measure metacomprehension at various levels of 
comprehension (e.g., Dunlosky & Lipko, 2007; Dunlosky et al., 2002; Salmen, 2004); 
however, results from this research have not provided a clear picture.   
The current study has shown that readers are sensitive to different levels of 
comprehension in making retrospective (posttest) confidence judgments of performance.  
In addition, as evidenced with immediate and delayed judgments of learning (Scheck et 
al., 2004), absolute accuracy appears to be susceptible to the effects of anchoring-and-
adjustment (Epley & Gilovich, 2006) when making posttest confidence judgments across 
question types of varying difficulty.  Relative accuracy (G) did not show any effects 
related to anchoring, therefore, as with previous studies, these results suggest that 
absolute and relative accuracy are measuring different components of 
metacomprehension.




































Note:  The stories in these test materials were adapted from portions of the following 
books:  Black Boy by Richard Wright; Black Elk Speaks by John G. Niehardt; Bless Me, 
Ultima by Rudolfo Anaya; Death Comes for the Archbishop by Willa Cather; Night by 
Elie Wiesel; and Steppenwolf by Hermann Hesse.  Liberties were taken with respect to 
details and presentation.  To provide proper credit to the originals, the subjects were 
shown the names of these books and their authors after they had finished the assessment.
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Richard and His Education  
Richard was a black American living in the Southern United States in the early 1900s—
also known as the Jim Crow South.  Racial segregation was common there and black 
people were often considered to be a lower class of citizen.  Richard had serious 
difficulties because of his high self confidence.  He was not willing to play the passive 
role that many white people expected of blacks.  He suffered abuse from whites as well 
as being shunned by his black friends and family who told him that it is better for black 
people to behave and simply stay in their place.  In 1925, he moved to Memphis and 
found a job with an optical company that employed blacks and whites.  Some of his 
coworkers were members of the Ku Klux Klan and the black employees were subjected 
to regular abuse.  For example, the elevator operator was a black man named Shorty who 
had been there for years.  He endured kicking and insults by white people in the 
company.  Shorty appeared to have no hope for change or future escape and he made a 
joke of being kicked in order to receive better tips from his abusers.  Richard felt 
contempt for Shorty.  
 
Richard enjoyed reading and writing.  He read an article about H. L. Mencken once and 
wanted to read more.  However, as a black man, he did not have access to the public 
library.  Richard worked with a Catholic man who had known some persecution against 
his religion.  And as a result, the two of them shared a common understanding about 
prejudice.  Richard was then able to borrow the man’s library card to continue his own 
education.  He read Mencken’s essays and discovered that writing could be a powerful 
weapon.  He also learned the names of other American authors.  He read the books of 
Theodore Dreiser and Sherwood Anderson.  It was a revelation when Richard discovered 
that there were others who felt alienated from the American way of life.  Richard also 
read some of the major European authors.  Through reading, he began to understand 
himself better.  Richard also developed a better understanding of white people.  They no 
longer seemed so strange to him; however, he felt compelled to hide everything that he 
was learning.  He worked, read, and played dumb for the sake of himself, his mother and 
brother.  He wanted to be able to bring them to Memphis with him.  
 
For Richard, his books and learning carried a burden.  He was isolated in his own secret 
world with no one to share his dreams and insights.  Conscious of the many forces in life 
that have helped to make him who he is, he knew that he must continue onward to 
become an American writer.  He also realized that black Americans lived as outsiders in 
their own country.  Richard came to accept these things.  He also learned to play the role 
expected of him by his family and by white people.  Richard did this because it could 
bring eventual escape by helping to provide the means to travel north and become a 
writer.  It was only a matter of time and he did so.  Unfortunately, Richard remained 
isolated and shared his intentions with no one when he left.  He lied about his reasons for 
leaving.  Traveling north, he did not feel a sense of promise or joy; rather, he felt the 
usual tension and fear.  Nevertheless, he had valuable lessons to share.  Richard was no 
victim.  He also realized then that his revenge would be to succeed despite those who 
tried to destroy him.  And his success might make them change.    
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Life for Richard was made significantly __________ on a regular basis as a result of his 
high self confidence. 
a. more challenging 
b. easier 
c. less predictable 
d. more social 
 
Some of the books that Richard borrowed from the public library and read were written 






Richard was feeling __________ as he traveled north from Memphis to pursue his dream 
to become a writer. 
a. the familiar anxiety 
b. a new sense of happiness 
c. less isolated 
d. sick 
 
Richard moved to the city of Memphis and this led to a time when he __________. 
a. met Shorty 
b. first experienced persecution 
c. first disagreed with friends 
d. learned to write 
 
Richard worked with a Catholic who knew persecution, and this led to Richard 
__________. 
a. reading more books 
b. having self confidence 
c. moving to Memphis 
d. becoming Catholic 
 
Playing the role expected of a black person in some way led to Richard __________. 
a. moving north 
b. borrowing a library card 
c. losing his friends 
d. moving south 
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According to the advice of Richard’s family, Shorty was doing a __________ thing by 






Following from Richard’s discovery about writing when reading Mencken, his future 






After a period of reading and learning, Richard realized that he __________ within his 
own country. 
a. was alienated  
b. belonged 
c. had many opportunities 
d. felt trapped 
 
 
Black Elk and His Visions  
 
Black Elk was an Oglala Lakota of the Sioux Nation.  He was born in 1863 and began 
hearing voices when he was four years old.  This frightened him a little at first.  When he 
was five years old, he had a vision of two men in the sky singing a sacred song.  Then 
one day, at the age of nine, Black Elk was eating when a voice told him to hurry because 
his Grandfathers were waiting for him.  He became very ill.  His arms, legs, and face 
became swollen and he could not walk.  Lying in his parents’ tipi, looking through the 
opening in the top, he saw the same men in the sky who sang the sacred song years ago.  
The men in the sky called to him, saying that his Grandfathers were waiting for him.  
Then Black Elk was transported in a cloud to a place made entirely of clouds, where he 
saw an incredible vision.  A horse greeted Black Elk and said that the horse would tell the 
story of himself and the others there.  The horse turned toward the four directions of the 
compass, and Black Elk saw that there were twelve horses in each direction. 
 
The horses in each direction were matching in color.  The horses in the north were white, 
the southern horses were yellowish gray, the eastern horses were light brown, and the 
western horses were black.  The horse beside him was a bay horse, a reddish brown color.  
The bay horse told Black Elk that the horses will take him to his Grandfathers.  As they 
moved along, the horses from the four directions followed in a formation and the sky was 
filled with dancing horses that changed into different animals.  They arrived at a cloud.  It 
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became a tipi whose door was a rainbow.  Inside, there were six Grandfathers.  Black Elk 
recognized them as the Powers of the World.  The Grandfather of the West told Black 
Elk that all of his Grandfathers around the world were having a council, and they would 
teach him.  Grandfather of the West gave Black Elk a cup of water containing the sky, 
which was the power to live, and also a bow, which was the power to destroy.  He told 
Black Elk that his spirit was Eagle Wing Stretches.  And then Grandfather of the West 
ran toward the west and changed into a starving, black horse.   
 
Grandfather of the North gave Black Elk an herb that strengthened the black horse.  
Grandfather of the North told Black Elk that he will create a nation and have the power of 
the white giant’s wing; then he ran toward the north, changing into a white goose.  
Grandfather of the East gave Black Elk a peace pipe with a spotted eagle on its stem, 
telling him that he will use this to heal the sick.  Grandfather of the South gave Black Elk 
a stick.  It sprouted branches.  Then birds were singing in them.  He told him that he 
would brace himself upon this cane, and his nation would brace itself upon it.  
Grandfather of the South also told Black Elk these powers would exist for four 
generations.  The fifth Grandfather was Great Spirit Above who stretched out his hands 
and became a spotted eagle, telling Black Elk that the birds will come to you, and the 
stars will be like brothers.  The sixth Grandfather was an old man who told him to have 
courage returning to earth.  Then the sixth Grandfather left the tipi through the rainbow 
door, becoming younger until he was Black Elk at nine years of age.   
 
At the age of nine, Black Elk became very sick and eventually his illness grew so serious 






Grandfather of the West gave a cup of water to Black Elk and said that this provided him 






Black Elk received a __________ from Grandfather of the East that was decorated with 
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Black Elk saw men in the sky when he was nine years old and this led to him 
__________. 
a. having a vision 
b. hearing a song 
c. getting sick 
d. singing 
 
Black Elk saw a host of horses dancing and this led to him seeing __________. 
a. a tipi with a rainbow door 
b. a place made of clouds 
c. two men 
d. his parents 
 
Black Elk’s meeting with Grandfather of the South led to him __________. 
a. hearing birds sing 
b. being given a pipe 
c. seeing a goose 
d. speaking with a bird 
 
Black Elk began to hear supernatural voices for the first time at the age of four, sometime 






Black Elk __________ the Powers of the World in a tipi that had a rainbow for a door. 
a. was given gifts from 
b. did NOT see 
c. briefly saw 
d. heard about 
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Antonio and His Sorrow  
 
Antonio’s sleep was troubled.  One night, Antonio dreamed of three young friends who 
had died.  In the dream, his three friends fought each other with sticks and knives.  Cico 
was also there and he had a spear.  He killed the golden carp with it.  And this turned the 
waters red.  Then Florence told him that the old gods were dying and pointed to the hills.  
There, Tenorio had killed the night-spirit of Ultima.  And now Ultima was dying.  
Antonio was overwhelmed and he asked why God has forsaken him.  He awoke from the 
dream, crying.  Ultima comforted him.  She suggested that he has known too much death 
in his life.  She also said that becoming a man always involves great sadness.  He should 
go work with his uncles in El Puerto to learn more about “growing life.”  Maria Luna y 
Márez, Antonio’s mother, asked Ultima to bless them both.  Ultima did so.  Then 
Antonio drove away with his father, Gabriel Márez.  He was traveling with his father to 
El Puerto to learn the art of being a good sheepherder.  Gabriel told his son that he 
became a man while learning the art of sheepherding.  Now it was time for Antonio. 
 
Speaking with his father on the journey, Antonio learned some things.  The opposing 
things in his life, such as the plains and valley, moon and sea, even God and the golden 
carp must merge and change.  The same thing must happen with his settled Luna heritage 
and his sense of Márez freedom.  In becoming a man, Antonio must combine his 
opposing backgrounds to create something new.   His father also told him that “evil” is 
only something that people do not understand.  He said true understanding can require a 
lifetime to achieve.  It was not as simple as being in one communion ritual.  And so 
Antonio spent the summer of 1947 working with his uncles.  In doing so, he learned to 
respect and care for the earth.  Then he gained strength from this experience.  As a result, 
he slept peacefully.  He realized that they were working in harmony with the lunar cycles.  
And at one point, Pedro told Antonio that he and the other Lunas were proud of what 
he’d learned.  However, their talk was interrupted when Juan arrived to speak with Pedro 
in private.  But Antonio overheard something from their conversation:  A man named 
Tenorio had vowed to kill Ultima. 
 
Pedro decided to drive to town in order to help Ultima.  Antonio understood and headed 
into town on foot.  He met Tenorio riding on horseback.  Cursing Antonio, Tenorio tried 
to trample him but failed.  Then Tenorio vowed to kill the owl that was the spirit of the 
old witch, and he rode away.  Antonio remembered something else that his father had 
told him while traveling:  True understanding requires sympathy for others.  He said that 
Ultima’s sympathy was so complete that she can heal others.  Antonio came to the home 
where Ultima was staying.  Pedro’s truck arrived.  Antonio saw Tenorio standing near a 
juniper tree with a rifle and cried out.  Tenorio turned his rifle on Antonio, so Ultima 
quickly called to her owl.  The owl flew above Tenorio, startling him.  Tenorio fired the 
rifle upwards and then picked up the dead owl in triumph.  Then Tenorio aimed again at 
Antonio.  Another shot was heard.  Pedro had fired a pistol.  Tenorio was hit in the 
stomach and he fell.  Antonio wrapped the owl in a blanket and rushed to Ultima.  She 
said her owl was simply flying to a new place, and she was now preparing to do the same 
thing. 
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Antonio __________ when he eventually awoke from his dream that occurred at the 
beginning of the story. 
a. was crying 
b. realized something 
c. spoke with his uncles 
d. felt rested 
 
After spending time with them, Antonio’s uncles became proud of him for his 
__________. 
a. learning 
b. Luna heritage 
c. Márez heritage 
d. lofty dreams 
 
When Antonio first met Tenorio on the way into town, Tenorio was __________. 
a. riding a horse 
b. driving a truck 
c. walking on foot 
d. riding a motorcycle 
 
Cico appeared in Antonio’s dream with a spear, and this led to __________. 
a. water turning red 
b. fighting between friends 
c. friends dying 
d. fighting with Florence 
 
In El Puerto, Antonio learned to respect the earth and this led to him __________. 
a. sleeping peacefully 
b. working with his uncles 
c. being blessed 
d. riding a horse 
 
Ultima called to her owl near the end of the story and following this, __________. 
a. the owl died 
b. Antonio saw Tenorio 
c. Pedro arrived  
d. Pedro saw Tenorio 
 
If Ultima’s advice to Antonio is correct, Antonio will surely have experienced 
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According to Antonio’s father, if people decided that Tenorio was evil, they __________. 
a. did not understand him 
b. probably knew of him 
c. were likely evil 
d. were judgmental 
 
According to Antonio’s father, if he had true understanding then he would have 
__________ other people. 
a. compassion for 
b. sadness for 
c. conflicts with 
d. power over 
 
 
Latour and His Final Years 
 
Latour had been a French Jesuit missionary serving in Ohio in the mid-1800s.  He was 
elevated to bishop and sent to Santa Fe in the New Mexico territory.  Bishop Latour left 
for Santa Fe with an old friend, Father Vaillant.  Although the region of New Mexico 
was predominantly Catholic, the local faith had been corrupted through a process of 
neglect lasting over three centuries and rogue priests had become greedy and abusive.  
Latour and Vaillant were sent to change things and they had some success over the years.  
Latour eventually became an archbishop.  Years later, Archbishop Latour retired and 
moved to a small estate four miles north of Santa Fe.  He planned to spend the remaining 
years of his life there.  An apricot tree that was about two hundred years old grew on the 
estate.  Even after so much time, the apricot tree continued to bear delicious fruit.  The 
Archbishop cultivated an orchard and a garden there.  He spent a lot of time gardening.  
He also instructed new priests in Spanish and in the local customs of the diocese.  He 
advised the priests to plant fruit trees in their parishes.  The fruit would help them to 
balance their Mexican diet.   
 
Archbishop Latour cultivated wildflowers on the estate that eventually covered the 
surrounding hillside in many shades of purple.  He also received a young priest, Bernard, 
for training.  Bernard was like a son to the Archbishop and helped to care for him.  Then, 
in 1889, Latour was drenched in a January rainstorm which caused a fever.  He asked the 
new Archbishop for permission to return to Santa Fe and die there.  Bernard told Latour 
that he wouldn’t die of a cold and Latour responded that he will not die from a cold, he 
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will die from having lived.  And then Latour began speaking only French.  This 
transformation alarmed the household.  In February, Latour returned to Santa Fe with 
Bernard.  He scheduled his return to occur with the sunset because that was the same time 
of day that he had first entered Santa Fe.  His family had expected him to return to 
France, but he preferred to stay in New Mexico because he felt young there and he loved 
breathing the air.  He stopped to admire the cathedral in Santa Fe.  He was pleased with 
how the French architect had built it in a manner that seemed to fit the surrounding 
landscape.   
 
In Santa Fe, Latour had little time remaining.  He dictated a local history of the Catholic 
Church to Bernard.  Latour described how the early Catholic missionaries from Spain 
entered New Mexico as a hostile territory and made many sacrifices, and as a result of 
sacrifice, Catholics arriving now were greeted by friendly people.  Latour tried to impress 
the significance of this upon the younger priests.  Latour also remembered his decision to 
leave France for America with Vaillant, who accompanied him on a mission from France 
to the New World, and later from Ohio to New Mexico.  Latour had encouraged Vaillant 
to pursue his mission in the New World.  With this encouragement, Vaillant decided to 
continue on.  And Vaillant accomplished many things despite bad health and other 
challenges.  Latour also realized that he had outlived most of his old acquaintances.  
During his last days, Latour slept most of the time and ate little.  He eventually refused 
food.  The cathedral filled with parishioners who prayed for him and Latour received last 
rites.  On his deathbed, he returned to the day many years ago when he convinced 
Vaillant to travel with him.  His final words were encouraging Vaillant onward to the 
New World. 
 
Archbishop Latour would often spend his time __________ after he retired to the estate 
north of Santa Fe. 
a. working in the garden 
b. visiting other parishes 
c. visiting the cathedral 
d. sleeping 
 
A priest __________ helped to take care of Archbishop Latour during his retirement on 
the estate north of Santa Fe. 
a. named Bernard 
b. named Vaillant 
c. whose name was not mentioned 
d. named Parish 
 
When Archbishop Latour was finally given last rites on his deathbed, __________ prayed 
for him within the cathedral in Santa Fe. 
a. many people 
b. a few people 
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c. no one 
d. one stranger 
 
Latour and Vaillant were sent to New Mexico, and this led to __________. 
a. less corruption there 
b. New Mexico becoming mostly Catholic 
c. Vaillant converting to Catholicism 
d. more rogue priests 
 
Latour asked for permission to return to Santa Fe and prepare for death and this led to 
Latour __________. 
a. speaking only French 
b. planting many flowers 
c. receiving Bernard 
d. planting many trees 
 
Latour encouraged Vaillant and this led to Vaillant __________. 
a. succeeding more than once 
b. becoming Catholic 
c. improving his health 
d. retiring with Latour in New Mexico 
 
The old apricot tree that grew on the estate where Latour eventually retired in the late 
1800s was a young sprout in __________. 
a. the late 1600s 
b. the late 1500s 
c. the early 1500s 
d. the early 1400s 
 
If Latour had first entered Santa Fe a few hours later, he would have scheduled his final 
return to Santa Fe during the __________. 
a. night 
b. late afternoon 
c. early afternoon 
d. morning 
 
In Latour’s view, people in New Mexico were usually __________ him because of 
missionaries who came there centuries ago. 
a. friendly toward 
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b. suspicious of 
c. hostile toward 
d. apathetic toward 
 
 
Elie and His Internment  
 
In the fall of 1944, the Nazi SS began a process of selection at the concentration camp.  
They separated the weak prisoners from the strong.  The weak were eliminated and Elie 
was given work dragging heavy blocks of stone.  Elie worried most for his aging father, 
Chlomo.  Following the initial selection, Elie’s father was called along with nine others 
from Block 36 for a second examination.  Chlomo feared that he would not return to see 
his son again.  Chlomo gave him a knife and a spoon, the only inheritance he had to pass 
along.  At the end of the day, he returned and Elie gave back his inheritance.  
Unfortunately, others did not return.  For example, the concentration camp had weakened 
Akiba and he knew he would not pass the selection process.  Even worse, he once held a 
strong faith in God and both his faith and body had been broken.  Akiba made a last 
request of his friends before leaving that they recite the Kaddish (a Jewish prayer) in his 
memory.  Over the next three days, conditions at the camp were terrible with exhausting 
work and cruel punishments.  And Akiba’s friends forgot their promise to recite the 
Kaddish for him. 
 
Their captors provided warmer clothes when winter came, but the prisoners still suffered 
from the icy temperatures at night and the difficult work conditions.  Elie entered a 
hospital in January of 1945 in order to drain pus from his foot.  Another inmate there in 
the ward told him that the sickest patients were selected for death.  The Jewish surgeon 
was nice to Elie, though, and told him that he would recover in a couple of days.  Then, 
in two days, they began to hear the sound of guns in the distance.  Rumors spread that the 
Red Army was approaching.  The SS evacuated most of the inmates from the hospital on 
the following day, taking them to central Germany.  Among them, Elie and Chlomo 
moved through the snow on a dangerous journey.  They learned later that the inmates 
who remained in the hospital were eventually freed by the Russians.  The evacuating 
prisoners were made to run and the SS shot all prisoners who fell behind.  Elie almost 
welcomed death.  Only concern for his father kept him going.  They kept going through 
the night and into the morning.  Then, at a rest stop, many froze to death beneath a 
covering of snow.   
 
Even the soldiers of the SS were weary.  Chlomo helped to keep Elie awake so that he 
would not freeze and they kept moving.  When they finally arrived at Gleiwitz, the 
prisoners were assigned into crowded barracks for the night.  In the darkness of the 
building, Elie was almost crushed and had to bite and claw for a breath of air.  
Somewhere in the crowd, he heard his friend Juliek play a fragment from a Beethoven 
concerto.  Juliek was a Polish musician who had managed to keep his violin with him.  
He was dead by morning.  Juliek and his instrument had been trampled on the floor.  The 
SS kept them in Gleiwitz for three days and they received no food or water.  The inmates 
also began to hear the sounds of gunfire outside the barracks.  This revived hopes the Red 
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Army may be advancing.  On the last day, the inmates were marched to the rail lines.  
They waited to be given one ration of bread and ate snow from each other’s backs to 
quench their thirst.  In the evening, a train made of roofless cattle cars arrived.  The SS 
herded a hundred of them into each car before setting out. 
 
The challenges and continual abuse associated with life in the concentration camp had 
__________ Akiba’s faith. 
a. weakened 
b. strengthened 
c. changed nothing about 
d. created 
 
The surgeon who treated Elie in the hospital for a problem with his foot and who treated 






Elie and the other prisoners were kept by the SS in Gleiwitz for __________ days before 
being marched to the rail lines. 
a. three 




News of a second exam in the camp led to Elie being given __________. 
a. a knife and spoon 
b. blocks of stone 
c. a summons to be examined again 
d. a violin 
 
After the SS evacuated inmates from the hospital, the Red Army __________. 
a. freed inmates there 
b. approached from far away 
c. fired guns nearby 
d. departed 
 
Elie’s assignment to a barracks in Gleiwitz led to him __________. 
a. hearing music 
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b. meeting a surgeon 
c. almost freezing to death 
d. being examined by the SS soldiers 
 
It became clear to the SS during the initial selection process that Elie was one of the 
__________ prisoners in Block 36. 
a. stronger 
b. weaker 
c. less dangerous 
d. more dangerous 
 
Before eventually reaching Gleiwitz, Elie and Chlomo __________ the group. 
a. stayed with 
b. fell behind 
c. became separated in 
d. slipped away from 
 
Elie’s friend Juliek was eventually killed by __________ in a crowded barracks. 
a. other prisoners 
b. SS soldiers 
c. extreme cold 
d. lack of water 
 
 
Steppenwolf and the Galleries  
 
Pablo invited Steppenwolf and Hermine into the Magic Theater.  It was the 1920s.  In blue 
light, they drank beverages containing mind-altering drugs.  According to Pablo, the elixir 
allowed someone to see the world of the soul.  Pablo held up a small mirror and 
Steppenwolf saw two different identities in it:  a broken man and a beautiful wolf.  Pablo 
told Steppenwolf that he must laugh at himself in the mirror in order to participate in the 
theater, where there were an endless number of galleries.  Steppenwolf did so.  
Consequently, the small mirror became dark.  Then Pablo turned Steppenwolf toward a 
larger mirror where he saw countless images of himself at all ages.  Some images jumped 
from the mirror into the galleries.  A fifteen-year-old boy jumped into the gallery labeled 
“All Girls Are Yours. One Quarter in the Slot.”  However, the first gallery that 
Steppenwolf chose to enter was “Jolly Hunting. Great Hunt in Automobiles.”  Within, war 
raged between humans and machines.  An old friend to Steppenwolf, Gustav, appeared in 
the gallery.  He was a theologian who left his job to fight in the war.  Gustav chose to fight 
against the machines although he did not especially care which side he chose.   
 
Gustav and Steppenwolf hid in a tree house and fired on passing cars.  They killed some 
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people and spared others; and they were ashamed of themselves when it was done.  The 
second gallery that Steppenwolf entered was labeled “Guidance in the Building Up of the 
Personality. Success Guaranteed.”  There, he met a chess player who offered to help 
Steppenwolf assemble his life.  The chess player resembled Pablo.  Steppenwolf looked 
again into a mirror and his image shattered into multiple selves that became chess pieces.  
These pieces were arranged on the chess board in different ways, with each exploring 
alternate realities.  Steppenwolf was distracted from the chess board by the gallery 
labeled “Marvelous Taming of the Steppenwolf.”  Within the gallery, a man commanded 
a wolf to perform various tricks:  kneeling, playing dead, retrieving a whip, etc., and 
Steppenwolf recognized himself as the man.  Steppenwolf felt these menial tasks 
destroyed the wolf’s nature and this horrified him.  Then the man and the wolf switched 
roles.  The wolf commanded the man to perform tricks.  The man removed his clothes, 
played dead, etc.  Then he killed a rabbit and lamb.  He devoured them raw.  Steppenwolf 
was shocked and ran disgusted from the third gallery. 
 
Steppenwolf entered the gallery labeled “All Girls Are Yours.  One quarter in the Slot.”  
He repeatedly relived the day when he met Rosa Kreisler and then decided to change the 
outcome in which no relationship had developed.  He proclaimed his love for Rosa and 
they grew to love each other.  Following Rosa, he relived moments with all of his loves, 
real or imagined, until he came to Hermine.  Steppenwolf left the fourth gallery 
exhausted to find the real Hermine.  The next gallery surprised him with the label, “How 
One Kills for Love.”  This reminded him of his first dinner with Hermine.  She had told 
him that she would eventually command him to kill her.  He became desperate and tried 
to retrieve his chess pieces to rearrange them.  The pieces in his pocket were gone.  
Instead, he only found a knife.  Steppenwolf looked in the mirror and saw the wolf 
grinning back.  Checking the theater, Pablo and Hermine had disappeared.  He checked 
the mirror again and the wolf was gone.  Instead, Harry was looking back.  Harry was his 
real self who said that he waited for death and it was approaching.  Steppenwolf heard 
Don Giovanni playing.  Then Mozart appeared and laughed.   
 
When Gustav appeared in the first gallery, he had been __________ to Steppenwolf. 
a. an old friend 
b. a new friend 
c. an acquaintance 
d. a stranger 
The label for the second gallery that Steppenwolf entered contained the words 
__________. 
a. Success Guaranteed 
b. How One Kills 
c. One Quarter in the Slot 
d. The Magic Theater 
 
In the fourth gallery, Steppenwolf relived a prior experience with __________ and then 
decided to change the outcome. 







Steppenwolf was told to laugh at himself and this led to the __________. 
a. small mirror darkening 
b. drinking of an elixir 
c. appearance of blue light 
d. small mirror showing two images 
 
Steppenwolf met a chess player and this led to Steppenwolf seeing __________. 
a. his image shatter 
b. Gustav 
c. himself at the age of fifteen 
d. blue light 
 
Steppenwolf found the chess pieces in his pocket were gone and this led to him seeing 
__________. 
a. a grinning wolf 
b. Hermine 
c. Pablo 
d. a chess player 
 
Steppenwolf saw many things when he first looked in the large mirror, including an 
image of __________. 
a. himself at the age of four 
b. a wolf 
c. Hermine 
d. Mozart 
In the gallery labeled “Marvelous Taming of the Steppenwolf,” the wolf commanded 




d. a stranger 
 
If the words that Hermine spoke to Steppenwolf came true, Steppenwolf would surely 
meet __________ again. 




c. the wolf 
d. Mozart 
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